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Executive Summary
We can’t wait for breakthrough technologies to deliver net-zero emissions by 2050. Instead, we can 
plan to respond to climate change using today’s technologies with incremental change. This will 
reveal many opportunities for growth but requires a public discussion about future lifestyles. 
We have to cut our greenhouse gas emissions to zero by 
2050: that’s what climate scientists tell us, it’s what social 
protesters are asking for and it’s now the law in the UK. But 
we aren’t on track. For twenty years we’ve been trying to 
solve the problem with new or breakthrough technologies 
that supply energy and allow industry to keep growing, so 
we don’t have to change our lifestyles. But although some 
exciting new technology options are being developed, it 
will take a long time to deploy them, and they won’t be 
operating at scale within thirty years.
Meanwhile, our cars are getting heavier, we’re flying more 
each year and we heat our homes to higher temperatures. 
We all know that this makes no sense, but it’s difficult to 
start discussing how we really want to address climate 
change while we keep hoping that new technologies will 
take the problem away.
In response, this report starts from today’s technologies: if 
we really want to reach zero emissions in thirty years time, 
what does that involve? Most of what we most enjoy - 
spending time together as families or communities, leisure, 
sport, creativity - can continue and grow unhindered. 
We need to switch to using electricity as our only form 
of energy and if we continue today’s impressive rates of 
growth in non-emitting generation, we’ll only have to cut 
our use of energy to 60% of today’s levels. We can easily 
achieve this with incremental changes to the way we use 
energy: we can drive smaller cars and take the train when 
possible, use efficient electric heat-pumps to keep warm 
and buy buildings, vehicles and equipment that are better 
designed and last much longer. 
The two big challenges we face with an all electric future 
are flying and shipping. Although there are lots of new 
ideas about electric planes, they won’t be operating at 
commercial scales within 30 years, so zero emissions 
means that for some period, we’ll all stop using aeroplanes. 
Shipping is more challenging: although there are a few 
military ships run by nuclear reactors, we currently don’t 
have any large electric merchant ships, but we depend 
strongly on shipping for imported food and goods.
In addition, obeying the law of our Climate Change 
Act requires that we stop doing anything that causes 
emissions regardless of its energy source. This requires 
that we stop eating beef and lamb - ruminants who 
release methane as they digest grass - and already many 
people have started to switch to more vegetarian diets. 
However the most difficult problem is cement:  making 
cement releases emissions regardless of how its powered, 
there are currently no alternative options available at scale 
and we don’t know how to install new renewables or  make 
new energy efficient buildings without it.
We need to discuss these challenges as a society. Making 
progress on climate change requires that the three key 
groups of players - government, businesses and individuals 
- work together, rather than waiting for the other two to 
act first. But until we face up to the fact that breakthrough 
technologies won’t arrive fast enough, we can’t even begin 
having the right discussion.
Committing to zero emissions creates tremendous 
opportunities: there will be huge growth in the use and 
conversion of electricity for travel, warmth and in industry, 
growth in new zero emissions diets, growth in materials 
production, manufacturing and construction compatible 
with zero emissions, growth in leisure and domestic travel, 
growth in businesses that help us to use energy efficiently 
and to conserve the value in materials.
Bringing about this change, and exploring the 
opportunities it creates requires three things to happen 
together: as individuals we need to be part of the process, 
exploring the changes in lifestyle we prefer in order to 
make zero emission a reality. Protest is no longer enough - 
we must together discuss the way we want the solution to 
develop; the government needs to treat this as a delivery 
challenge - just like we did with the London Olympics, on-
time and on-budget; the emitting businesses that must 
close cannot be allowed to delay action, but meanwhile 
the authors of this report are funded by the government to 
work  across industry to support the transition to growth 
compatible with zero emissions.
Breakthrough technologies will be important in future but 
we cannot depend on them to reach our zero emissions 
target in 2050. Instead this report sets an agenda for a 
long-overdue public conversation across the whole of UK 
society about how we really want to achieve Absolute Zero 
within thirty years. 
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Leisure, sports, creative arts and voluntary work: These 
sectors can expand greatly and should have a central 
position in national definitions of welfare targets.
Electricity sector and infrastructure: Absolute Zero 
requires a 3x expansion in non-emitting electricity 
generation, storage, distribution and load-balancing.
Construction sector: All new build should be to zero-
energy standards of use. The impacts of construction 
are primarily about the use of materials, primarily steel 
and cement. By 2050, we will have only very limited 
cementitious material and will use only recycled steel, 
but there are myriad opportunities for radical reductions 
in the amount of material used in each construction. 
Steel sector: All exsiting forms of blast furnace production, 
which are already under great pressure due to global 
over-capacity, are not compatible with zero-emissions. 
However, recycling powered by renewables, has 
tremedous opportunities for growth exploiting the fact 
that steel scrap supply will treble in the next 30 years. 
There are short term innovation opportuniteis related 
to delivering the highest quality of steel from recycling, 
and longer-term opportunities for technologies for zero-
carbon steel making from ore that could be deployed 
after 2050. 
Cement sector: All existing forms of cement production 
are incompatible with zero emissions. However, there 
are some opportunities for expanded use of clay an 
urgent need to develop alternative processes and 
materials. Using microwaves processes to  recycle used 
cement appears promising. 
Mining and material supply: Zero emissions will drive a 
rapid transition in material requirements. Significant 
reduction in demand for some ores and minerals, 
particularly those associated with steel and cement, 
are likely along with a rapid expansion of demand for 
materials associated with electrification.  It seems likely 
that theire will be opportunities for conslidation in 
the currently diffuse businesses of secondary material 
collection, processing, inventory and supply. 
Rail: The great efficiency of electric rail travel suggests a 
significant expansion of electric rail travel, domestically 
and internationally, is likely and would see high demand. 
The most efficient electric trains are aerodynamically 
efficient, like those designed for the highest speed 
operation today, but travelling at lower speeds. 
Road vehicles: The transition to electric cars is already 
well under-way, and with increasing demand, costs will 
presumably fall. We already have targets for phasing out 
non electric vehicles, but by 2050 will have only 60% 
of the electricity required to power a fleet equivalent 
to that in use today. Therefore we will either use 60% 
fewer cars or they will be 60% the size. Development 
of auto-grade steels from recycling is a priority, and 
the need to control recycled metal quality may require 
changed models of ownership.  The rapid expansion of 
lithium battery production may hit short-term supply 
constraints and create environmental concerns at end-
of-life unless efficient recycling can be developed. 
International freight: We currently have no non-emitting 
freight ships, so there is an urgent need for exploration of 
means to electrify ship power, and options to transfer to 
electric rail. This would require an enormous expansion 
in international rail capacity.
Aviation: There are no options for zero-emissions flight 
in the time available for action, so the industry faces a 
rapid contraction.  Developments in electric flight may 
be relevant beyond 2050. 
Fossil fuel industries: All coal, gas, and oil-fuel supply from 
extraction through the supply chain to retail must close 
within 30 years, although carbon capture and storage 
may allow some activity later.  
Travel and tourism: Without flying, there will be growth in 
domestic and train-reach tourism and leisure. 
Food and agriculture: Beef and lamb phased out by 
2050 and replaced by greatly expanded demand for 
vegetarian food. Electricity supply for food processing 
and storage will be cut by 50%. 
Building maintenance and retrofit: Rapid growth in 
demand for conversion to electric heat-pump based 
heating matched to improvements in insulation and air-
tightness for building envelopes. 
Key messages for industrial sectors
Key Message: Absolute Zero creates a driver for tremendous growth in industries related to 
electrification, from material supply, through generation and storage to end-use. The fossil fuel, 
cement, shipping and aviation industries face rapid contraction, while construction and many 
manufacturing sectors can continue at today’s scales, with appropriate transformations.
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As individuals we can all work towards Absolute Zero 
through our purchasing and our influence. Each positive 
action we take has a double effect: it reduces emissions 
directly and encourages governments and businesses to 
be bolder in response. Where we cause emissions directly 
we can have a big effect by purchasing differently. Where 
they are released by organisations rather than individuals, 
we can lobby for change.
The actions stated as absolutes below are those which  will 
be illegal in 2050 due to the Climate Change Act.
Living well
The activities we most enjoy, according to the UK’s 
comprehensive time-use survey, are  sports, social-life, 
eating, hobbies, games, computing, reading, tv, music, 
radio, volunteering (and sleeping!) We can all do more of 
these without any impact on emissions.
Travelling
The impact of our travelling depends on how far we travel 
and how we do it. The most efficient way to travel is with a 
large number of people travelling in a vehicle with a small 
front and we can all reduce our total annual mileage.
1. Stop using aeroplanes
2. Take the train not the car when possible.
3. Use all the seats in the car or get a smaller one
4. Choose an electric car next time, if possible, which 
will become easier as prices fall and charging 
infrastructure expands.
5. Lobby for more trains, no new roads, airport closure 
and more renewable electricity.
Heating and appliances: 
Our  energy bills are mainly driven by our heating and hot 
water.    
1. Use the boiler for less time, if possible, staying warm 
by only heating rooms if people are sitting in them, 
sealing up air gaps and adding insulation. 
2. Wear warmer clothes  in winter.
3. Next time you replace the boiler, choose an electric air 
or ground-source heat pump if possible
4. Buy smaller more efficient appliances that last longer
5. Lobby for zero-carbon building standards, means-
tested support for housing retrofit and more 
renewable electricity
Purchasing: 
Most industrial emissions relate to producing materials, 
which are made efficiently but used wastefully so we 
need to reduce the weight of material made. The highest 
volumes of material are used not by households, but to 
make commercial and public buildings and infrastructure, 
industrial equipment and vehicles.
1. Lobby businesses and the government to build 
buildings and infrastructure with half the material 
guaranteed for twice as long. 
2. When extending or modifying your home, try to 
choose recycled or re-used materials and avoid 
cement.
3. Aim to reduce the total weight of material you 
purchase each year.
4. Lobby for border controls on emissions in materials 
(like we have with food standards) to allow businesses 
fit for Absolute Zero to grow and prosper in the UK 
Eating: 
Small changes in diet can have a big effect.
1. Reduce consumption of beef and lamb as these have 
far higher emissions than any other common food.
2. Choose more locally sourced food if possible, to 
reduce food miles, particularly aiming to cut out air-
freighted foods.
3. Aim to use less frozen and processed meals as these 
dominate the energy use of food manufacturers.
4. Lobby supermarkets to support farmers in using less 
fertiliser - it has a high impact, but much of it is wasted 
as it’s spread too far away from the plants.
Key messages for individuals
Key Message: The big actions are: travel less distance by train or in small (or full) electric cars and 
stop flying; use the heating less and electrify the boiler when next upgrading; lobby for construction 
with half the material for twice as long; stop eating beef and lamb. Each action we take to reduce 
emissions, at home or at work, creates a positive ripple effect.
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Timelines:
In her last significant act as Prime Minister, Theresa May 
changed the UK’s Climate Change Act to commit us to 
eliminating all greenhouse gas emissions in the UK by 
2050.  This decision is based on good climate-science, was 
a response to a great wave of social protest and has been 
replicated in 60 other countries already.
However, 30 years is a short time for such a big change. 
Politicians in the UK and internationally talk about climate 
change as if it can be solved by new energy technologies 
alone, and UK government reports are over-confident 
about how much progress has been achieved; in reality 
most UK cuts in emissions have been as a result of Mrs 
Thatcher’s decision to switch from coal to gas fired 
electricity and to allow UK heavy industry to close. The 
UK has been successul in reducing methane emissions - 
by separating our organic waste and using it in anaerobic 
digesters to make gas for energy, but new energy 
technologies are developing slowly. 
There are no invisible solutions to climate change so 
we urgently need to engage everyone in the process of 
delivering the changes that will lead to zero emissions.
Confusion about technologies
In this report we’re using three different descriptions of 
the technologies which cause emissions:
• Today’s technologies are the mass-market products 
of today - such as typical petrol or diesel cars.
• Incremental technologies could be delivered today if 
customers asked for them - for example  smaller cars.
• Breakthrough technologies such as cars powered by 
hydrogen fuel cells, may already exist, but haven’t yet 
captured even 5% of the world market.
Incremental technologies can be deployed rapidly, but 
breakthrough technologies can’t. We’re concerned that 
most plans for dealing with climate change depend on 
breakthrough technologies - so won’t deliver in time.
Why we’ve written this report now
The authors of this report are funded by the UK government 
to support businesses and governments (national and 
regional) to develop a future Industrial Strategy that’s 
compatible with Zero Emissions. To do that, we have to 
anticipate how we’ll make future goods and buildings, and 
also think about what performance we want from them. 
What we mean by “Absolute Zero”
The UK’s Climate Change Act contains two “escape” 
words: it discusses “net” emissions and targets on those 
that occur on our “territory.”  However, in reality, apart 
from planting more trees, we don’t have any short-term 
options to remove emissions from the atmosphere, and 
even a massive expansion in forestry would have only a 
small effect compared to today’s emissions.   Furthermore, 
shutting factories in the UK doesn’t make any change to 
global emissions, and may make them worse if we import 
goods from countries with less efficient processes. 
Public concern about the Climate is too well informed to 
be side-lined by political trickery on definitions.  In writing 
this report, we have therefore assumed that:
• the target of zero emissions is absolute - there are no 
negative emissions options or meaningful “carbon 
offsets.” Absolute Zero means zero emissions;
• the UK is responsible for all emissions caused by its 
purchasing, including imported goods, international 
flights and shipping.
Invitation to participate
This report presents our best estimate of Absolute Zero, 
based on publicly reported data and peer-reviewed 
evidence. Undoubtedly there are more opportunities that 
we don’t know of, and if this report proves useful, there 
will be other aspects of the journey to Absolute Zero that 
we can help to inform. We welcome contributions and 
comment and will provide an edited summary of any 
discussion on www.ukfires.org. If there is demand, we will 
update and re-issue the report in response.
Please contact us via info@ukfires.org and if you found this 
report useful, please share it through your networks.
Why this report matters
Key Message: We are legally committed to reducing the UK’s emissions to zero by 2050, and there 
isn’t time to do this by deploying technologies that don’t yet operate at scale. We need a public 
discussion about the changes required and how to convert them into a great Industrial Strategy.
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Figure 1.2: Data from the International Energy Agency 
(IEA, 2018) with data on CCS installations at 
power-stations from the Oil and Gas funded pro-CCS 
lobby, Global CCS Institute. 
Figure 1.3: This analysis by Vaclav Smil (2014) looks at 
global deployments of the three major fossil fuels, 
relative to total world energy demand at the time. Some 
faster transitions have occurred in individual countires, 
as shown in the box story on page 3.
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2050 Absolute Zero2020-2029 2030-2049 Beyond 2050
Development of petrol/diesel engines ends; Any 
new vehicle introduced from now on must be 
compatible with Absolute Zero
All new vehicles electric, average size of cars 
reduces to ~1000kg.
New options for energy
storage linked to expanding non-emitting electricity
may allow demand growth
Road use at 60% of 2020 levels - through reducing 
distance travelled or reducing vehicle weight
Road vehicles 
Growth in domenstic and international rail as 
substitute for ights and low-occupancy car travel
Further growth with expanded network and all 
electric trains; rail becomes dominant mode for 
freight as shipping declines
Train speeds increase with increasing availability of zero 
emissions electricity
Electric trains the preferred mode of travel for 
people and freight over all signicant distances, Rail
All airports except Heathrow, Glasgow and Belfast 
close with transfers by rail
All remaining airports close
Electric planes may y
with synthetic fuel once  there are excess non-emitting 
electricity supplies
Flying
There are currently no freight ships operating 
without emissions, so shipping must contract
All shipping declines to zero.
Some naval ships operate 
with onboard nuclear power and new storage options 
may allow electric power
Shipping
Electric heat pumps replace gas boilers. and 
building retrots (air tightness, insulation and 
external shading) expand rapidly
Programme to provide all interior heat with heat 
pumps and energy retroifts for all buildings
Option to increase use 
of heating and cooling as supply of non-emitting 
electricity expands
Heating powered on for 60% of today’s use.Heating
Gas cookers phased out rapidly in favour of 
electric hobs and ovens. Fridges, freezers and 
washing machines become smaller.
Electrication of all appliances and reduction in 
size to cut power requirement.
Use , number and size of
appliances  may increase with increasing zero-emnis-
sions electricity supply
All appliances meet stringent eciency standards, 
to use 60% of today’s energy.Appliances
National consumption of beef and lamb drops by 
50%, along with reduction in frozen ready meals 
and air-freighted food imports
Beef and lamb phased out, along with all 
imports not transported by train; fertiliser use 
greatly reduced
Energy available for
fertilising, transporting and cooking increases with 
zero-emissions electricity
Total energy required to cook or transport food 
reduced by 60%. Food
Reduced demand for iron ore and limestone as 
blast furnace iron and cement reduces. Increased 
demand for materials for electrication
Iron ore and Limestone phased out while metal 
scrap supply chain expands greatly and 
develops with very high precision sorting
Demand for iron ore
and limestone may develop again if CCS applied
to cement and iron production
Demand for scrap steel and ores for electrication 
much higher, no iron ore or limestone. 
Mining  material 
sourcing
Steel recycling grows while cement and blast 
furnace iron reduce; some plastics with process 
emissions reduce.
Cement and new steel phased out along with 
emitting plastics . Steel recycling grows. 
Aluminium, paper reduced with energy supply.
Material production may 
expand with electricity and CCS, CCU, hydrogen may 
enable new cement and steel.
All materials production electric with total 60% 
power availability compared to 2020
Materials 
production
Reduced cement supply compensated by 
improved material eciency, new steel replaced 
by recycled steel
All conventional mortar and concrete phased 
out, all steel recycled. Focus on retrot and 
adaption of existing buildings.
Growth in cement replacements to allow more 
architectural freedom; new steel may become available.
Any cement must be produced in closed-loop, 
new builds highly optimised for material saving. Construction
Material eciency becomes promiment as 
material supply contracts
Most goods made with 50% as much material, 
many now used for twice as long
Restoration of reduced material supplies allows 
expansion in output, although some goods will in 
future be smaller and used for longer than previously.
Manufacturing inputs reduced by 50% compen-
sated by new designs and manufacturing 
practices. No necessary reduction output.
Manufacturing
Wind and solar supplies grow as rapidly as 
possible, with associated storage and distribution. 
Rapid expansion in electriciation of end-uses.
Four-fold increase in renewable generation from 
2020, all non-electrical motors and heaters 
phased out.
Demand for non-emitting electricity drives ongoing 
expansion in supply.All energy supply is now non-emitting electricity.Electricity
Rapid reduction in supply and use of all fossil 
fuels, except for oil for plastic production Fossil fuels completed phased out
Development of Carbon
Capture and Storage (CCS) may allow resumption
of use of gas and coal for electricity
Fossil fuels
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1. Zero emissions in 2050 with today’s technologies
Key Message: Apart from flying and shipping, all of our current uses of energy could be electrified. 
With tremendous commitment the UK could generate enough non-emitting electricity to deliver 
about 60% of our current final energy-demand, but we could make better use of that through 
incremental changes in the technologies that convert energy into transport, heating and products.
About three quarters of the greenhouse gas emissions 
caused by humans are emitted when we burn the fossil 
fuels - coal, gas and oil - and the rest arise from our 
agriculture (particularly cows and sheep), our conversion 
of land from forestry to pasture, the way we allow organic 
waste to decompose, and our industrial processes. Using 
today’s technologies, all of these sources un-related to 
energy have no alternative, so reducing our emissions to 
zero means phasing out these activities.
Our emissions related to energy come from our use of oil 
(as diesel, petrol or kerosene) for transport, our use of gas 
for heating our homes and industrial processes, and our 
use of coal and gas to generate electricity. Some of our 
electricity is also generated without burning fossil fuels - 
for instance by nuclear power stations, wind turbines or 
solar cells - and in a zero emissions future these will be our 
only source of energy.  Most of our current uses of energy 
could be electrified - as is becoming familiar with electric 
cars - but there are currently no options for electric flying 
or shipping. With today’s technologies, these modes of 
transport must therefore be phased out also.
Over the past 10 years in the UK, we have made a significant 
change to the way we generate electricity and about half 
of our generation is now from non-emitting sources.  If we 
continue developing the generation system at the same 
rate, then by 2050 we will have around 50% more  electric 
power than we have today. Data on the efficiencies of 
today’s motors and heaters allows us to estimate that this 
will be enough to power about 60% of today’s energy-
using activities (apart from flying and shipping). However, 
because energy has been so cheap and abundant in 
the past 100 years, in many cases we could make small 
changes to existing technologies to make much better use 
of less energy.
Figure 1.1 summarises this overview of Absolute Zero 
with today’s technologies: the left side of the figure shows 
the recent history of the UK’s non-emitting electricity 
generaton extrapolated forwards to 2050. The right side 
shows the amount of electricity we’d need if we electrified 
everything we do today, apart from those activities that 
inevitably cause emissions, which we’ll have to phase out.
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Figure 1.1: Gap between today and Absolute Zero
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1.1 Energy Supply Today
The science is clear: we must stop adding to the stock 
of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere to control 
global warming. In response, the best estimates of 
science today predict that annual global emissions from 
human activities must be reduced rapidly and should 
be eliminated by 2050 – in thirty years’ time. This target, 
which requires extraordinarily rapid change, is now law 
in the UK, and several other countries. However, despite 
the science and the laws, global emissions are still rising. 
The critical choice in planning to cut emissions is about 
the balance between technology innovation and social 
choice. Is it possible to develop a new technology that 
will cut emissions while allowing people in developed 
economies to continue to live as we do today and to 
allow developing economies to develop the same 
behaviours?  Or should we first modify our behaviour to 
reach the emissions target, with different aspirations for 
development, and then take the benefits of technology 
innovation when they become available later? To date, 
as illustrated in fig 1.2, every national and international 
every national and international government plan for 
responding to climate change has chosen to prioritise 
technology innovation, yet global emissions are still 
rising. 
For twenty years, two technologies have dominated policy 
discussions about mitigating climate change: renewable 
energy generation and carbon capture and storage (CCS). 
The two renewable technologies now being deployed 
widely are wind-turbines and solar-cells. These critical 
forms of electricity generation are essential, and should 
be deployed as fast as possible, but fig. 1.3 shows that 
they combined with nuclear power and hydro-electricity 
still contribute only a small fraction of total global energy 
demand. Meanwhile, although CCS has been used to 
increase rates of oil extraction, its total contribution to 
reducing global emissions is too small to be seen. The 
technological elements of CCS have all been proven at 
some scale, but until a first fleet of full-scale power-plants 
are operating, the risks and costs of further expansion 
will remain high and uncertain. To illustrate the current 
importance of CCS in global power generation, the total 
output of all CCS enabled power-generation is shown on 
fig. 1.3 - still very definitely on top of the y-axis.
All previous transitions in the energy system, for example 
in figure 1.4, have occurred relatively slowly. Early 
installations experience problems due to human error, and 
the installation of large generation requires lengthy public 
consultation on land-rights, environmental protection, 
safety and financing. Despite this, CCS looks very attractive 
to policy makers. Twenty years ago, the International 
Energy Agency stated that “within 10 years we need 
10 demonstrators of CCS power stations” but none are 
operating at full-scale today. Yet in 2019 the UK’s Climate 
Change Committee published its plans to deliver zero 
emissions, requiring deployment of CCS in six of thirteen 
sectors within thirty years. However, the UK has no current 
plans for even a first installation and although CCS may be 
important in future, it is not yet operating at meaningful 
scale, but meanwhile global emissions are still rising. 
The hope of an invisible, technology-led, solution to 
climate change is obviously attractive to politicians and 
incumbent businesses.  However, a result of their focus 
on this approach has been to inhibit examination of our 
patterns of energy demand. Figure 1.6a shows that the 
UK’s demand for energy is only falling in industry. This is 
because in the absence of a meaningful industrial strategy, 
we have closed our own industry in favour of increased 
imports. As a result, this apparent reduction in energy 
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use is compensated by an increase in other countries. 
Meanwhile, demand in other sectors is rising, driven, for 
example, by an increase in the weight of our cars and 
increased use of heating to raise internal temperatures 
in winter (fig. 1.6b). With thirty years remaining to deliver 
zero emissions, we cannot risk waiting for a different 
energy system, so must have an inclusive public discussion 
about how we use energy, because global emissions are 
still rising. 
2019 has seen a great rise in public concern about 
climate change, driven by science and growing evidence 
of changes occurring. So far, the social protesters have 
called for “someone to do something” without engaging in 
discussion about solutions, but the only solutions available 
in the time remaining require some change of lifestyle. This 
report therefore aims to trigger that critical discussion. The 
report starts with a plan to reach zero emissions by 2050 
using only technologies that are already mature today, 
to minimise the risk that we continue emitting beyond 
2050. This is possible but requires some specific restraint 
in our lifestyles. Innovation can relieve this restraint so the 
report then presents an overview of the range of options 
for innovation in the way we use energy as well as how we 
generate it. 
Global emissions are still rising and the need for action is 
urgent. This report aims to allow us to start an informed 
discussion about the options that really will deliver zero 
emissions by 2050.
Technology Transitions in the Energy System
New computers, clothes and magazines can be put on sale soon 
after the are invented. However new energy technologies have 
typically required much longer time to reach full scale: even if 
the technology is well-established, building a power station 
requires public consultation about finance, safety, land-rights, 
connectivity and other environmental impacts all of which take 
time. For new technologies, it takes much longer, as investors, 
operators and regulators all need to build confidence in the 
safety and perfomance of the system. Figure 1.5 summarises 
the rates of introduction of various new energy technologies 
in the countries where they grew most rapidly. The green arrow 
corresponds to the start points of the linear periods of growth 
shown in figure 1.4.
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Key Message: Global demand for energy is rising. In the UK our demand has fallen, but only 
because we have closed industry and now import goods elsewhere. Policy discussions have 
prioritised breakthrough technologies in the energy system, particularly carbon capture and storage, 
but it is at such an early stage of development that it won’t reduce emissions significantly by 2050.
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Figure 1.5: Years to deploy energy technologies
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1.2 UK Energy System now and in 2050
Climate change is driven by greenhouse gas Emissions. 
Most emissions arise from burning fossil fuels to create 
Energy; some of our energy use is in the form of Electricity. 
These three words beginning with “E” are often confused 
in public dialogue, but figure 1.7 separates them.  Three 
quarters of global emissions (slightly more in the UK 
because we import 50% of our food) arise from the 
combustion of fossil-fuels (coal, gas and oil). Most coal 
and one third of gas is used in power stations to generate 
electricity. However, we also generate electricity by 
nuclear power and from renewable sources.  The third 
column of the figure shows that nearly a half of the UK’s 
current electricity supply is from non-emitting sources, of 
which nuclear power and the use of imported bio-energy 
pellets are most important.
Figure 1.8 shows how the UK’s energy supply has developed 
over the past twenty years. Total demand has fallen, due to 
the loss of industry shown in fig. 1.6, but our use of oil and 
nuclear power has been relatively constant. (The figures in 
both figures disguise the fact that over this period the UK’s 
population has grown by 16% so we have improved the 
efficiency of our energy use by around 0.5% per year.) The 
other major change in the figure is the switch from coal to 
gas powered electricity generation which has reduced UK 
emissions significantly. 
Figure 1.9 extracts from fig 1.8 our generation of electricity 
– the numbers in this figure for 2018 correspond to those 
shown in fig 1.7c – and divides them into emitting and non-
emitting sources. This figure shows the UK making good 
progress in de-carbonising its current levels of electricity 
supply, and if the linear-trends in the figure continue, then 
by 2050, the UK can be expected to generate around 580 
TWh of electricity without emissions. This is the figure 
shown on figure 1.1 at the beginning of this chapter.
If we can manage our electricity distribution system and 
find ways to store electricity from windy/sunny times to 
be available at still/dull times this suggests that by 2050 
we will have around 60% more electricity available than 
today, all from non-emitting sources. Physically, although 
the Hinckley C Nuclear Plant will probably by completed 
by 2030, delivering this increase will largely come from 
increasing wind-generation. To meet this growth from 
offshore wind would require an addition of around 4.5 GW 
of generation capacity each year of the next 2 decades 
(allowing time for them to be fully operational by 2050). 
By comparison, the Crown Estate have just launched a 
process to award 7-8.5 GW of new seabed leases over the 
next 2 years, but the Offshore Wind Sector Deal expects 
Government support for the delivery of only 2 GW/year 
through the 2020s.
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Figure 1.8: UK Primary Energy supply (Mtoe/yr)
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Meanwhile fig 1.10 shows how the two options for on-
shore generation, wind-turbines and solar power, are 
developing. Both technologies are becoming cheaper, 
although the amount of power generated from each unit of 
land is increasing only slowly.  Replacing existing on-shore 
wind turbines with much taller models could increase total 
generation by 50%. Increasing solar generation depends 
on the commitment of area, but is plausible: if every south-
facing roof in the UK were entirely covered in high-grade 
solar cells, this would contribute around 80TWh per year
Figure 1.7 also shows a range of bio-energy sources 
contributing to the UK’s energy supply. All these supplies 
are combusted, leading to the release of CO2, but because 
the fuel derives from plants, these releases form part of 
the normal cycle so do not accelerate climate change. 
Waste policy has been a success in UK mitigation since 
1990, with organic waste separated and largely processed 
in anaerobic digestors to produce methane for electricity. 
However, this source is unlikely to increase further. 
Meanwhile, bio-energy derived directly from new plant 
growth is in competition with the use of biomass for food 
so unlikely to increase (see box story on p13).
This discussion suggests that, using today’s technologies 
and with plausible rates of expansion, the UK will in a zero-
emissions 2050 have an energy supply entirely comprising 
electricity with about 60% more than generated that we 
have today. 
How much of the benefit of all of today’s use of energy 
will we be able to enjoy without any fossil fuels, but 
with 60% more electricity? At first sight, this sounds 
like a significant reduction - fig. 1.7 showed that today, 
electricity provides only about one third of our total energy 
needs, so apparently we would need a 200% increase in 
electricity output?  In fact this isn’t the case, because the 
final conversion of electricity into heat or rotation is very 
efficient compared to the fossil fuel equivalents.
If the UK is to run entirely on electricity, then all devices 
currently powered with fossil-fuels must be replaced 
by electrical equivalents. Figure 1.11 presents a view of 
how energy is used globally. (We don’t currently have 
an equivalent of this for the UK, but the UK is likely to 
be similar, although with less industrial use, due to our 
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Figure 1.11: Global transformation of energy to services
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dependence on imports.) The widths of the lines in the 
figure are proportional to energy use, and any vertical cut 
through the diagram could be converted into a pie-chart 
of all the world’s energy use.  In effect fig. 1.11 shows six 
connected pie-charts, each breaking out the statistics of 
all the world’s energy use into different categories.
The figure shows that most energy is used in engines, 
motors, burners and heaters to create motion or heat. To 
estimate the electricity required if all of these devices are 
replaced, we use the average efficiencies presented in fig. 
1.13: for example, we know how much power is currently 
delivered in the UK’s cars by petrol engines, so can use fig. 
1.13 to predict how much electricity would be required to 
provide the same power from electric motors. Combining 
this conversion with an estimated 11% population growth, 
leads to our prediction that we would need 960 TWh of 
electricity by 2050. (A terawatt hour, Twh, is a thousand 
million kilowatt hours - the unit normally used in UK energy 
bills.) The final requirement for electricity is split between 
motion, heating and appliances as shown in Fig 1.14.  
If the UK is fully electrified by 2050, and we used the 
same final services as today,  our demand for energy as 
electricity will be 960 TWh. However, based on a linear 
projection of the rate at which we have expanded our non-
emitting electricity supply in the past 10 years, we estimate 
that we will have just 580 TWh available. Therefore, our 
commitment to absolute zero emissions in 2050 requires 
a restraint in our use of energy to around 60% of today’s 
levels.
Key Message: If we only used electricity, delivering all the transport, heat and goods we use in the 
UK would require 3x more electricity than we use today. If we expand renewables as fast as we can, 
we could deliver about 60% of this requirement with zero emissions in 2050. Therefore in 2050 we 
must plan to use 40% less energy than we use today, and all of it must be electric.
Figure 1.14: UK requirement to electrify today’s services
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What’s the problem with bio-energy?
The world’s poorest people stay warm and cook with wood burnt on 
open furnaces, and this energy source shows up significantly in the 
global energy supplies of fig. 1.11. Could we use modern technology 
to harness even more biomass to make other fuels, such as biodiesel 
or kerosene? Fig 1.12 reveals that more than 20% of the world’s total 
annual harvest of new biomass is already ‘appropriated’ by humans 
for wood, food and fodder. This annual harvest is the fundamental 
source of habitat and food for all non-aquatic species. Any further 
appropriation by humans is likely to be dangerously harmful to 
other species and the effect of deforestation rates is already a major 
contributor to the emissions in fig. 2.10. This evidence suggests that 
modern bio-fuels are incompatible with any wider sustainability of life 
on earth.
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Figure 1.12: Human appropriation of biomass
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1.3  Zero emissions in the UK in 2050
In addition to restraining our energy demand to 60% of 
current levels, meeting our legal commitment to zero 
emissions will require that we phase out any energy using 
activities that cannot be electrified and any sources of 
emissions beyond fossil-fuel combustion. Planning for 
this requires that we make a collective decision about 
the scope of our responsibility. The UK’s Climate Change 
Act was written to make commitments based solely 
on emissions that occur on UK territory. However, this 
excludes international aviation and shipping and our net 
imports of goods. As a result, it appears to be a success for 
UK climate policy when we shut UK industry and instead 
import goods – even though this will not reduce global 
emissions, and may often increase them if the closed UK 
processes were more efficient. Although these limitations 
were helpful in passing the Climate Change Act into law, 
they now look morally questionable, and they also fail 
to create the stimulus to innovation and growth in UK 
businesses and industries fit for a zero emissions future. 
This report therefore assumes that the UK should be 
responsible for the emissions of all its consumption.  
Figure 1.15 shows an analysis of all global greenhouse 
gas emissions, using a format similar to fig. 1.11. In this 
case, the final services that drive the activities that cause 
emissions are shown at the left of the diagram, leading to 
the greenhouse gasses on the right side of the diagram 
which cause global warming. The yellow-loop in the middle 
of the figure demonstrates that most industrial emissions 
are associated with producing the buildings, vehicles and 
other equipment which provide final services from energy, 
but which themselves require energy in production. This is 
important because most of this year’s industrial output is 
to produce equipment (durables) that will last for several 
years. The services provided in one year therefore depend 
on the accumulation of a stock of goods made in previous 
years - and this long-lasting stock limits the rate at which 
change can be made to our total emissions.  For example, 
if cars last on average for 15 years, then to ensure that all 
cars are electric in 2050, the last non-electric car must be 
sold no later than 2034. As with fig. 1.11, fig. 1.15 is based 
on global data - again to reflect the consequences of UK 
consumption, rather than its “territorial” emissions.
The top three quarters of this figure demonstrate the 
emissions consequences of our use of energy. The two 
critical forms of equipment that cannot be electrified with 
known technology are aeroplanes and ships. Although 
Solar-Impulse 2, a single-seater solar-powered electric 
aeroplane circumnavigated the Earth in 2016, it is difficult 
to scale up solar-powered aeroplanes due to the slow 
rates of improvement in of solar cell output put unit 
of area shown in fig. 1.10. Meanwhile battery-powered 
flight is inhibited by the high weight of batteries, bio-fuel 
substitutes for Kerosene face the same competition for 
land with food as described in section 1.2 and there are 
no other ready and appropriate technologies for energy 
storage.  As a result, under the constraint of planning for 
zero emissions with known technologies, all flying must be 
phased out by 2050 until new forms of energy storage can 
be created. At present we also have no electric merchant 
ships. There isn’t space to have enough solar cells on a ship 
to generate enough energy to propel it, and as yet there 
has been no attempt to build a battery powered container 
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Key Message: In addition to reducing our energy demand, delivering zero emissions with today’s 
technologies requires the phasing out of flying, shipping, lamb and beef, blast-furnace steel and 
cement. Of these, shipping is currently crucial to our well-being - we import 50% of our food - and 
we don’t know how to build new buildings or install renewables without cement. The need for 
this restraint will be relieved as innovation is deployed but many of our most valued activities can 
continue and expand, and Absolute Zero creates opportunities for growth in many areas.
ship. Nuclear powered naval ships operate, but without 
any experience of their use for freight, we cannot safely 
assume that nuclear shipping will operate at any scale in 
2050.  This is a serious challenge: with today’s technologies, 
all ship-based trade must be phased out by 2050.
Figure 1.15 further reveals that the two key sources of 
non-energy related emissions are in agriculture and 
industrial processes.  Agricultural emissions arise primarily 
from ruminant animals – in particular cows and sheep 
– which digest grass in the first of their two stomachs 
in a process that releases methane and from land-use 
change.  Converting forestry to agricultural land leads to 
the release of the carbon stored in the forest and the loss 
of future carbon storage as the trees grow. In addition, 
ploughing the land releases carbon stored in the soil, 
and using Nitrogen based fertilisers to stimulate plant 
growth leads to further emissions. The motivation for this 
conversion of forestry land is to increase food production, 
but is greatly exacerbated by the demand for meat eating. 
Growing grain and other feed for cows, pigs and sheep is 
exceptionally inefficient, as up to 80 times more grain is 
required to create the same calories for a meal of meat as 
for a meal made from the original grain. As a result, our 
commitment to zero emissions in 2050 requires that we 
refrain from eating beef and lamb. 
Three industrial processes contribute significant emissions 
beyond those related to energy. Blast furnaces making 
steel from iron ore and coke release carbon dioxide and 
half of the emissions from current cement production 
come from the chemical reaction as limestone is calcined 
to become clinker. There are no alternative processes 
available to deliver these materials, and although old steel 
can be recycled efficiently in electric arc furnaces, there are 
no emissions-free alternatives to cement being produced 
at any scale.  As a result, a zero-emissions economy in 
2050 will have no cement-based mortar or concrete, and 
no new steel. The absence of cement is the greatest single 
challenge in delivering Absolute Zero, as it is currently 
essential to delivering infrastructure, buildings and new 
energy technologies. 
The final source of direct industrial emissions is the 
group of “F-gases” which have diverse uses, including as 
refrigerants, solvents, sealants and in creating foams. It 
may be possible to continue some of these applications 
beyond 2050 if the gases are contained during use and at 
the end of product life.
Delivering Absolute Zero in thirty years with today’s 
technologies is possible. Our energy supply will be 60% less 
than today, and solely in the form of electricity, but apart 
from flight and shipping, all other energy applications can 
be electrified. Socially motivated action is leading some 
change in both travel and diet. The most challenging 
restraint is on the bulk materials used in construction, in 
particular in the absence of cement, which will constrain 
the deployment of new energy supplies and economic 
development which depends on building.
However, despite these restraints, the most striking feature 
of this analysis is how many features of today’s lifestyles 
are unaffected.  Many of the leisure and social activities we 
most enjoy can continue with little change, many forms 
of work in service sectors will flourish, and the transition 
required will also lead to substantial opportunities for 
growth, for example in renewable electricity supply and 
distribution, in building retrofit, in electric power and 
heat, in domestic travel, material conservation, plant-
based diets and electrified transport. Delivering Absolute 
Zero within thirty years with today’s technologies requires 
restraint but not despair and of course any innovation that 
expands service delivery without emissions will relieve the 
required restraint. That’s the theme of the second chapter 
of this report. 
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2.1 Products in-use and consumables 
In the UK, the use of final products and consumables 
accounts for almost three quarters of current annual 
emissions. 12% of UK emissions come from domestic food 
production, waste disposal and land use changes, but two 
thirds are produced by our use of vehicles and buildings. 
These mostly come from road transport and heating in 
buildings, but to what extent can innovation help reduce 
these emissions to zero?
Using energy in buildings
Figure 2.2 shows that most energy uses in buildings are 
for heating air (space) and water, mostly by combustion 
of gas in individual boilers in each building. Absolute zero 
emissions requires a complete electrification of energy 
uses in buildings. Although appliances and lighting are 
already electric, space and water heating must change.
Heat pumps, based on principles similar to the familiar 
domestic fridge - but in reverse, offer a viable alternative 
to gas boilers. Since heat pumps are around four times 
more efficient than direct heat of combustion, complete 
deployment of best-practice heat pumps could save 
approximately 80% of current energy demand for 
heating. Heat pumps can be used in two forms: as a direct 
replacement for a gas-boiler they can provide hot water 
for a conventional radiator system. However, the best use 
of heat pumps is with ducted air heating - which requires a 
more intrusive modification of a building, but saves more 
energy. Deploying heat pumps would almost double the 
demand for electricity in buildings from current levels, so 
further interventions to reduce the demand for heating 
are also important.
New buildings are much more efficient than old Victorian 
houses still in use today — better insulation and design 
result in much smaller heating requirements. However, 
2. Innovations to make more use of less energy
Key Message: With incremental changes to our habits and technologies, there are multiple options 
for living just as well as we do today, with 60% of the energy. With electric heat pumps and better 
insulation we can stay just as warm. With smaller electric cars we can keep moving, and by using 
materials better, we can make buildings and goods compatible with our zero emissions law.
This chapter starts from the analysis of electricification 
in chapter 1, summarised in fig. 2.1: below the line, all of 
today’s non-electric uses of energy must be electrified. 
Any activities that lead to emissions regardless of energy 
source or that cannot be electrified must be phased 
out. If we electrify all remaining activities with today’s 
technologies, we require the amount of electricity shown 
in the second column - but we’ll only have 60% of that 
amount available.  For each of the sectors in fig. 2.1, we 
therefore look at all the options for a more efficient future.
Section 2.1. focuses on the way we use energy directly - 
in buildings and vehicles - and on the way we source our 
food. Sections 2.2-2.4 explore how we make things - firstly 
looking at how we produce materials, which is what drives 
most of today’s industrial emissions, and then in how we 
use them in construction and manufacturing. It turns out 
that we are already very efficient in our use of energy 
when making materials, but wasteful in the way we use 
the materials - so there are plenty of options for living well 
while using half as much material for twice as long.
For completeness, in section 2.5 we survey the 
“breakthrough technologies” that are unlikely to be 
significant by 2050, but could expand afterwards.
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Figure 2.1: Absolute Zero overview
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the turnover of the UK’s building stock is very slow - we 
like old buildings  - so refurbishment of old houses is 
important. Already, we have made substantial efforts to 
retrofit double glazed windows and to install high quality 
insulation in roofs and attics, and this could be completed 
to ever higher-standards to reduce national energy 
demand for heating.  
For new build homes, Passive designs which only use the 
sun for heating, and need electricity only for ventilation, 
lighting and appliances are now well established. Until 
2015, the UK’s zero-carbon homes standards promoted 
this form of design, which is applied rigorously in Sweden, 
and at current rates of building, would affect 20% of the 
UK’s housing if enforced now. The cost of houses built 
to the Passive standard is approximately 8-10% more 
than standard construction, and the thick walls required 
slightly reduce the available internal space, in return for 
zero energy bills.
Figure 2.3 summarises the options for operating buildings 
under the conditions of Absolute Zero: whatever happens 
we must electrify all heating. We could then either use 
the heating for 60% of the time we use it today, or apply 
other incremental changes in building design to maintain 
today’s comfort with 60% of the energy input.
Figure 2.2: Energy use in buildings
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Figure 2.3: Reducing energy use in buildings with incremental technologies or reducing demand with today’s technology
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Using energy in transport
Figure 2.4 shows that almost all of today’s transport 
involves the direct combustion of fossil fuels in the vehicle, 
with only 1% of transport powered by electricity, in electric 
trains. Without technology options to replace aeroplanes 
and ships with electric equivalents, the second column of 
the figure assumes that these modes have been phased 
out in thirty years, so the electricity available for transport 
can be divided between rail and road vehicles. 
Figure 2.5 demonstrates the opportunity for energy saving 
through adjusting the way we travel.  The figure shows 
both the energy and emissions consequences of a person 
travelling a kilometre by different modes: these two figures 
are closely correlated except for flight, where the emissions 
at high altitude cause additional warming effects.  The 
figure underlines how important it is to stop flying - its’ 
the most emitting form of transport and we use planes to 
travel the longest distances. A typical international plane 
travels at around 900km/hour, so flying in economy class 
equates to  180kgCO2e per person per hour (double in 
business class, quadruple in first class, due to the floor area 
occupied.) Flying for ~30 hours per year is thus equal to a 
typical UK citizen’s annual emissions. 
The key strategies to reduce energy use in transport 
depend on the form of journey. Short distance travelling 
involves frequent stops and restarts, so a substantial 
share of energy is used to accelerate a vehicle and its 
contents. As a result, reducing the weight of the vehicle 
and travelling less become key strategies to reduce energy 
demand. At present UK cars are on average used with 1.8 
people inside, but weigh around 1,400 kg, which is ~12 
times more than the passengers, so almost all petrol is 
used to move the car not the people.  Figure 2.6 illustrates 
how reducing the ratio of the weight of the vehicle to 
the weight of the passengers trades off with distance 
travelled and energy used. Regenerative braking offers 
a technological opportunity to recapture some of the 
energy used in accelerating vehicles, and is under active 
development.
For long-distance travelling most energy is used to 
overcome air resistance, so the key to reducing energy 
demand is to reduce top speeds (aerodynamic forces 
increase with speed squared) and drag by using long 
and thin vehicles — trains. Rail transport is thus the most 
efficient transport mode for long-distance travelling, and 
if a higher share of trips is made by train rather than car, 
Figure 2.6: Car travel - trading weight and distance
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Figure 2.5: “Mode shift” for personal transport
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substantial energy savings can be achieved without loss 
of mileage. A full electric train can move people using 40 
times less energy per passenger than a single-user car. 
Other modes of transport can also reduce energy 
demand in transport. For example, in the Netherlands, 
approximately 20% of all distance travelled is by bicycle, 
compared to only 1% in the UK.
Although there are opportunities to reduce energy 
demand by mode shift in freight transport, substantial 
savings could also be achieved by logistical improvements. 
Up to 30% of energy demand in freight could be saved 
with an optimised location of distribution centres and with 
the creation of new collaborative networks to promote co-
loading. Technology to facilitate the implementation of 
these logistical strategies already exists or is expected to 
become available over the next five years, although this 
also requires new corporate partnerships.
Figure 2.7 summarises the options for electrifying UK 
transport and using 60% of the energy.  Either vehicles are 
modified - with regenerative braking, reduced drag and 
rolling resistance (better tyres), and weight reductions, 
or we can choose to use them less - through ride-sharing, 
better freight management, or an overall reduction in 
distance travelled.
Can we make & recycle enough batteries?
Lithium battery manufacturing requires a wide range of metals, 
most of which only exist in nature at very low concentrations. 
Cobalt is one of the most valuable and is currently essential to 
the stability and lifetime of batteries. If new car sales are to be 
completely electric within 5 years, we will need to make 50 
million batteries by 2050, just in the UK. Most cobalt production 
is obtained as a by-product of nickel and copper mining, so could 
only expand if demand for these materials expand in proportion. 
Batteries can be recycled, but separating the materials in them is 
difficult and mining new metals is tehrefore currently cheaper than 
recycling. There is no simple route to recycle lithium batteries at 
present, but the surge in old batteries shown in Figure 2.8 should 
trigger innovation to address this.
Figure 2.8: Estimated volumes of electric car batteries 
reaching their end-of-life  in the UK (millions/yr)
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Land-use, food and waste
Figure 1.15 demonstrated that around a quarter of 
global emissions arise from good production and the 
decomposition of organic wastes. The UK figures in fig. 1.7 
show this fraction being closer to one sixth, which reflects 
the fact that the UK imports around half of its food. Figure 
2.10 provides more detail on these non-energy and non- 
industrial emissions.
As waste biomass breaks down to compost, it releases 
either carbon dioxide (if the biomass is in contact with 
air) or methane, which is a much more potent greenhouse 
gas and is the main driver of the emissions from waste 
decomposition. However, methane is the gas we use in 
cooking or in gas fired electricity generation, and the 
greatest success of recent UK climate policy has been to 
reduce these emissions significantly. Households across 
the UK now expect to discard organic wastes in their green 
bins, which are collected as the feedstock for anaerobic 
digesters which generate methane for energy production 
as shown in figure 1.7. As a result, UK landfill methane 
emissions have reduced by more than 50% since 1990 and 
will be close to zero by 2050.
The other major sources of emissions in figure 2.10 are 
largely related to ruminant animals – cows and sheep – 
grown for meat and dairy consumption. Ruminants digest 
grass in their first stomach, leading to methane emissions 
(enteric fermentation) while also releasing methane with 
their manure. In parallel, rising global demand for food is 
driving demand for increased biomass production, around 
half of which is to feed animals and in turn this drives 
forestry clearance. Trees are a substantial store of carbon, 
so clearance increases emissions either as CO2 if the wood 
is burnt, or more damagingly, as methane if left to rot. The 
clear implication of fig 2.10 is that eating lamb and beef 
will be incompatible with Absolute Zero.  
This message is underlined in fig. 2.9 which gives an 
estimate of the emissions associated with a meal with 
typical portions of different diets. The figure demonstrates 
that a vegetarian meal isn’t emissions free, and a meat-
based meal (with pork or chicken) may not have much more 
impact than one based on pulses.  However, the ruminant 
meats stand out so are a priority action in moving towards 
Absolute Zero.
The market for vegetarian food is currently growing rapidly, 
as rising social concern about emissions has motivated 
many individuals to switch to a more plant-based diet. 
There is significant potential for innovation in extending 
and developing new manufactured meat substitutes. 
Research has also begun to examine whether alternative 
feeds could eliminate ruminant emissions, but this is not 
yet mature.
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Figure 2.10: Global emissions from agriculture, and organic waste (total in 2010: 17 Gt CO2e)
Key Message: Most of today’s UK lifestyles can continue and grow within the target of Absolute 
Zero. Changing the way we travel (in particular not flying, and making better use of wheeled 
vehicles), stay warm (using electric heat pumps instead of gas boilers) and eat (cutting out lamb and 
beef ) are the most important changes that we would notice. In parallel, small changes in the design 
of buildings and vehicles can make them more efficient. However the biggest challenge revealed in 
this section is the use of shipping for freight: at the moment we have no alternatives.
Figure 2.9: Emissions intensities of food
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2.2 Materials and Resources
The implications of the analysis of chapter 1 for material 
production are summarised in figure 2.11. The UK imports 
much of our material requirement - either as materials, 
components or finished goods - so around half of the 
impact of our consumption today leads to the release of 
greenhouse gas emissions in other countries. Of the bulk 
materials that drive most industrial emissions, paper and 
aluminium production are the only two for which electricity 
is the dominant energy source. The processes that make 
materials can nearly all be electrified, but the challenge 
to Absolute Zero is to deal with the production processes 
that inevitably lead to emissions.  Blast furnace steel can 
be replaced by steel recycled in electric furnaces, and this 
leads to the expansion of electricity for steel production 
shown in the figure.  However, we currently have no means 
to avoid the emissions of cement production - even if the 
process were electrified - because the chemical reaction 
that converts limestone into cement inevitably releases 
carbon dioxide. Without innovation, we will be unable 
to use concrete or mortar - the two forms in which we 
generally use cement - but because this is so difficult to 
envisage, we have allowed some electric supply for the 
production of cement alternatives.
Starting from cement, this section explores the opportunity 
for innovation to expand the available supply of materials 
within absolute zero emissions. 
Cement
Cement hardens when mixed with water because the 
solid products of the reaction (called hydrates) have a 
higher volume than the cement powder and thus form a 
solid skeleton. Only a few elements in the periodic table 
have this property and are also widely found in the Earth’s 
crust. The elements available in the earth’s continental 
crust with an abundance higher than 1% are silica (60.6%), 
Alumina (16.9%), iron oxide (6.7%), lime (6.4%), magnesia 
(4.7%), sodium oxide (3.1%) and potassium oxide (1.10%). 
Of these, Portland cement mainly uses calcium and silica, 
with aluminium, iron, calcium and sulphur also playing 
a minor role. Calcium and aluminium together can form 
a heat-resistant cement used in refractory applications. 
Magnesium, sulphur and aluminate can also work together 
as a cement, but attempts at making a reliable product 
from them have proven unsatisfactory. Iron does not form 
hydrates with a high volume. Thus, the key ingredient to 
Portland cement is calcium, which is found mostly in the 
form of limestone (or calcium carbonate), as the fossilised 
remains of micro-organisms which have combined CO2 
and calcium to form shells for billions of years.
60% of emissions from cement production arise from 
the chemical reaction of calcination in which limestone 
is converted to clinker - the precursor of cement. The 
remaining emissions are due to the  combustion of fossil 
fuels (and waste materials) in kilns. Although heating 
processes may be electrified in the future, process 
emissions from calcination would be unavoidable, 
unless alternative sources of calcium oxide are found 
to replace limestone in cement production. Currently 
it appears to be impossible to produce cement with 
absolute zero emissions. Technology innovation on the 
alternatives to calcination and reconfiguration of the 
cement industry could enable zero emissions in cement 
production. However, any innovation in these processes 
would probably require a substantial reduction in cement 
demand from current levels. 
Currently, the construction industry makes use of many 
substitute materials to reduce the total demand for 
cement: both fly ash a by-product of burning coal, and 
ground granulated blast furnace slag, a by-product of the 
steel industry are used. Together, they reduce the need 
for pure Portland cement by about 20%. However, in a 
zero-carbon world, neither of these products would be 
available - as coal combustion and blast furnaces would 
not be possible - which leads to an increase in the need 
for new cement.
It is possible to produce pre-cast products (bricks, blocks, 
or slabs) with zero or even negative emissions, whether 
Figure 2.11: Energy use in producing materials
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using micro-organisms which transform CO2 to calcite 
or through bubbling CO2 through magnesium sulfo-
aluminate cement-based mixes. These could satisfy 
some of the construction industry’s needs, but we have 
no alternative binders to replace Portland cement on 
construction sites. It is  often claimed that geopolymers (fly 
ash or slag which react to form hydrates in the presence 
of alkalis) could replace Portland cement. However, this 
is not an option in a zero-carbon world because the base 
materials for geopolymer come from highly emitting 
industrial processes (burning coal and coking steel) which 
will not continue.
Pre-cast products could  replace at most 14% of current uses 
of cement, but without binders, they could not be  used 
for foundations or repairs even of critical infrastructure. 
One of the most common structural elements in today’s 
commercial buildings, the flat slab which is cast in place 
from liquid concrete brought to site in mixer trucks and 
used to build floors, would disappear: the only available 
option would be pre-cast elements, but these could not 
be finished as they are now with a thin layer of concrete 
(called a screed). A currently popular construction method, 
composite construction using thin concrete slabs poured 
over corrugated steel sheets and beams, would also be 
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impossible, despite being more materially efficient than 
the reinforced concrete flat slab.
There are two complementary paths that might lead to 
reducing the emissions from cement production. 
Firstly, there may be new sources of cement replacement, 
and new low-carbon feeds for the production. A promising 
source of cement replacement is kaolinite-rich clay. 
Kaolinite is an oxide of aluminium and silicium, which 
when calcined at 850 C transforms into metakaolin which 
is an amorphous, reactive product. Because of the lower 
calcination temperature, this material is about half as 
energy intensive as Portland cement. It has the interesting 
property that it can react with raw limestone to form 
hydrates, as well as substitute cement. Thus substitution 
levels of up to 65% can be achieved without lowering 
strength. In the UK, waste from kaolinite mining in Wales 
can provide a good source of clay to calcine. London clay 
is of a poorer quality but could still be used if the strength 
requirements of new construction were lowered. 
The second path to producing zero-carbon cement is to 
eliminate limestone from the feed of cement. An abundant 
source of calcium which is not carbonated is concrete 
demolition waste. Current best practice suggests that 
approximately 30% of the limestone feed of a cement kiln 
can be replaced by concrete demolition waste. This limit 
is due to the presence of the concrete aggregates, but if a 
separation process was established, and only the cement 
paste from concrete demolition waste was used, then it 
could be possible to produce cement without chemical 
process emissions. 
The amount of demolition waste available yearly in the 
UK could cover an important fraction of our yearly needs, 
provided heroic efforts were made to make good use of 
this available source of materials. 30 Mt of demolition 
waste is produced yearly (2007 value from the National 
Federation of Demolition Contractors), 59% of which is 
concrete of which 20% is cement paste. An 80% yield in 
separating aggregates from paste would then provide 3 
Mt of low carbon feed for the kilns to produce new cement. 
Figure 2.12 illustrates a summary of this narrative, 
comparing today’s UK requirements for cement (or more 
generally, “cementitious material”) in the upper picture, 
and the maximum possible supply we can envisage within 
the constraints of Absolute Zero in the lower picture. 
Section 2.3 will consider the opportunities to deliver 
construction with the 75% reduction in cement production 
implied by this figure.
Finally, there are many possible options for structural 
elements not using concrete and steel, including rammed 
earth, straw-bale (ModCell), hemp-lime, engineered 
bamboo and timber (natural or engineered). Often, these 
materials claim superior carbon credentials, which may be 
exaggerated, but they also come with enhanced building-
physics attributes, including insulation, hygrothermal and 
indoor air quality benefits. These could be used to substitute 
concrete in some applications, but would require different 
design processes and choices of architectural forms.
Steel
Recycling steel in electric arc furnaces powered by 
renewably generated electricity could supply most of 
our needs for steel, as it already does in the US. Almost 
all steel is recycled already (the exception is where steel 
is used underground, in foundations or pipework) and 
as figure 2.13 shows, the average life of steel-intensive 
goods is around 35-40 years. The amount of scrap steel 
available globally for recycling in 2050 will therefore be 
approximately equal to what was produced in 2010. Fig. 
2.14 shows how the balance of global steel production can 
evolve in the next 30 years to be compatible with Absolute 
Zero: blast furnace steel making, which inevitably leads 
to the emissions of greenhouse gas due to the chemical 
reaction involved in extracting pure iron from iron ore 
using the carbon in coal, must reduce to zero. Meanwhile, 
recycling which happens in electric arc furnaces could be 
powered by renewable electricity to be (virtually) emissions 
free, and can expand with the growing availability of steel 
for recycling. Even without action on climate change, 
the amount of scrap steel available globally for recycling 
will treble by 2050. In order to meet the requirements 
of Absolute Zero, this valuable resource can be the only 
feedstock, as there is currently no alternative technology 
for producing steel from iron ore without emissions.
Figure 2.13: Life expectancy of steel by application
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Recycled steel can have the same quality as blast furnace 
steel. In fact, some of the highest quality aerospace 
grades of steel used in the UK are made in Rotherham 
by recycling. However, the quality depends on the mix of 
metals supplied to the electric arc furnace, and is degraded 
in the presence of any significant quantity of tin or copper. 
Tin enters the steel recycling stream because of the use 
of tin-plate to make food cans, but this is relatively easily 
managed: these cans can be separated from other end-of-
life steel and a mature process already operates at scale to 
separate the tin from the steel.  
Copper is more of a problem in steel recycling, because 
current waste management involves shredding used cars 
and domestic appliances to separate metal from other 
materials, and these products contain many electric 
motors and associated wiring made from copper. There is 
a rich field of opportunity in responding to this problem, 
which could include: removing motors and wiring 
prior to shredding; improved separation of metals after 
shredding; metallurgical processes to remove copper 
from the liquid metal created by the electric arc furnace; 
developing new downstream processes to cope with 
copper contamination in the steel; eliminating copper 
for example by substituting it with aluminium.  Fig. 2.15 
presents a survey of metallurgical processes for reducing 
copper concentrations in liquid steel, from 0.4% (a typical 
value today for average UK steel scrap recycling) to around 
0.1% (the threshold for higher quality applications such as 
car bodies) as a function of energy input. The high grade 
steels made in Rotherham are purified with vacuum arc 
remelting, with high energy (and therefore financial) cost, 
but the figure demonstrates how many other opportunities 
could be developed given the motivation provided by 
Absolute Zero.
Steel production is extraordinarily energy-efficient, and 
consequently steel is remarkably cheap. As a result, it is 
used wastefully, and in most applications we could deliver 
the same end-user service from half the amount of steel 
used for twice as long – i.e. requiring only 25% of annual 
steel production. This strategy of material efficiency 
depends on practices in construction and manufacturing 
so is discussed further in sections 2.3 and 2.4. 
Non-ferrous metals
The production of non-ferrous metals is already almost 
completely electrified. The most notable example is 
aluminium production, which alone uses 3.5% of global 
electricity and the demand for this metal is currently 
growing rapidly. In theory, Aluminium recycling 
requires only 5% of the energy used to produce primary 
aluminium, although in reality with additional processing 
for cleaning scrap aluminium prior to melting it, diluting it 
with primary metal to control quality, and with inevitable 
downstream processing, a more accurate figure is around 
30%. However, as demand for aluminium is growing 
rapidly, there is currently not enough scrap available to 
supply current demand, so within Absolute Zero future, 
primary production must continue - with output reduced 
in proportion to the supply of non-emitting electricity. 
Problems of contaminations which undermine the quality 
of recycled aluminium, could be a basis for innovation in 
improved processes to separate aluminium in end-of-life 
waste streams or modify composition in its liquid state.
Critical metals
Critical metals are so called, because of their growing 
demand and risks associated to their supply. There 
are no problems of scarcity for these metals, but their 
global availability is very unequal — most reserves are 
concentrated in very few locations, often in countries with 
volatile political environments, and several critical metals 
are produced as by-products of other larger-volume 
metals. Most of the production processes for critical metals 
are already electrified, but these are very energy-intensive 
Figure 2.15: Options to reduce copper concentration
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due to the need to concentrate these metals from ores 
in which they naturally have very low concentrations. 
Unfortunately, recycling critical metals may require even 
more energy than primary production, because they are 
typically used as alloys and it is more difficult to separate 
them from the complex mix of metals in recycling than 
from the more controlled compositions in which they are 
found in nature. Absolute Zero, which requires a significant 
expansion of electrification, is likely to increase demand for 
critical metals which enhance the performance of motors, 
but this demand will come at the cost of an unavoidable 
growth in demand for electric power.
Ceramics
Ceramics and bricks are mostly produced from clays. These 
need to be vitrified at high temperatures in a kiln. Currently, 
heat is obtained from fossil fuel or waste combustions, 
but electric alternatives exist for all temperatures of kiln. 
Some colours in ceramics require reduction firing, which 
requires a stage in the kiln with a reducing atmosphere. 
This is currently obtained by fuel combustion, and 
thus alternatives to this practice will required. The 60% 
constraint on available electricity implies a 60% constraint 
on ceramics production in 2050.
Mining
Mining uses energy for two main purposes: shifting rocks 
and mined products in heavy “yellow” vehicles, and crushing 
them to allow the chemical processes of extraction. Both 
uses can be electrified but at present, yellow vehicles 
largely run on diesel while the power for crushing and 
grinding depends on local conditions. Potentially, there 
may be more energy efficient technologies for crushing 
and grinding, but already there is a competitive market 
looking for these, so breakthroughs are unlikely.  However, 
within the constraints of Absolute Zero, the elimination of 
coal and iron ore mining will significantly reduce the total 
energy demand of the sector, providing “head-room” in the 
non-emitting electrical-energy budget for the expansion 
of mining associated with wide-scale electrification.
Glass
Most current glass production uses natural gas-fired 
furnaces. These could be electrified, but a reduction in 
production would be required in proportion with the 
available supply of emissions-free electricity.
Fertilisers
CO2 from ammonia production is currently captured and 
used for urea production. Urea is then used as a fertiliser, 
delivering nitrogen to the roots of plants and crops, but as 
urea decomposes in the soil it releases the embedded CO2 
to the atmosphere. Overall, 2 tonnes of CO2 are produced 
per tonne of urea used. Ammonium nitrate is an alternative 
fertiliser to urea, but it is produced from ammonia, thus 
leading to the same emissions, although all occurring in 
the chemical plant.
Carbon capture technologies could eventually be 
deployed, but this would only be compatible with a 
substantial reduction from current production. However, 
there are substantial opportunities to reduce energy use 
by reducing demand for fertilisers. Existing evidence 
suggests that more fertilisers are used than the nitrogen 
requirements to grow crops. For example, a study for the 
Netherlands shows that the use of fertilisers could be 
halved without loss in productivity, if used more efficiently.
Plastics
Approximately 1 tonne of CO2 is emitted per tonne of plastic 
produced, but more than double this CO2 is produced 
when plastic waste is incinerated. Plastics are made from 
oil - and they are therefore the most valuable component 
of existing waste streams, if the waste is burnt for energy. 
However, if plastic is combusted, it is in effect a fossil-fuel. 
As a result, plastic incineration is not compatible with the 
goal of Absolute Zero.
Plastic can be recycled, rather than incinerated, either 
by mechanical or chemical means. Mechanical recycling 
preserves the chemical structure and composition 
of polymers, and is normal practice within existing 
manufacturing processes: scrap at the exit of a plastic 
extrusion machine, for example, can be fed directly back 
into the machine for re-extrusion.  However, this is possible 
only when the composition is known and under control. 
The great attraction of plastics is that they can be tailored 
to every application - with different colours, densities, 
textures, strengths and other characteristics according 
to each design specification. However, this tremendous 
variation is a curse for recycling: in current mechanical 
recycling of end-of-life plastics, the composition of the 
resulting product is uncontrolled and therefore of little 
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value. Furthermore, plastic waste is often mixed with other 
materials, hence the levels of purity of new plastics cannot 
be achieved by recycling, which therefore leads inevitably 
to down-cycling. A frequent example is packaging PET, 
which cannot be recycled back to food-grade standards 
and is thus used in lower-value applications.
In contrast, in chemical recycling, polymers are broken 
down into their constituent monomers which are then 
recovered to synthesise new plastics. At present, it is only 
economically attractive to recycle plastics mechanically, 
requiring less than half of the energy for new production. 
However, in future, chemical recycling by pyrolysis and 
gasification may allow plastic waste recovery for high-
value applications. As yet, it has proved difficult to 
operate pyrolysis processes at scale, they require high 
temperatures, and have yield losses of up to 40%, partly 
due to use of part of the feedstock to generate heat.
Recyclability is also dependent on the type of polymers 
available in waste streams. Figure 2.16 shows the annual 
flows of plastics in end-use products purchased in 
the UK by type of polymer and application. Although 
approximately 40% of annual plastics demand is used in 
packaging, these have short service lives and are quickly 
returned to waste streams. A great variety of polymers is 
used for each application, which hinders the identification 
and separation of polymers in waste streams, thus 
limiting the recyclability of plastics. Currently, land-filling 
plastics leads to almost no emissions. Plastics are stable 
when landfilled so do not generate methane. However, 
land-filling neither saves the production of new primary 
plastics, nor does it contribute to the future availability of 
material for recycling, unless it is cleaned and separated 
prior to landfill for storage.
Other chemicals
The chemicals industry produces a wide variety of 
products. Methanol, olefins and aromatics are produced in 
much smaller quantities than most plastics and fertilisers, 
but are important precursors to a variety of chemical 
products. Emissions arise from energy uses and chemical 
processes. Although most energy uses can be electrified, 
it may be very difficult to continue producing many of 
today’s chemicals without releasing process emissions.
Paper
The paper industry globally uses a third of its energy 
from its own biomass feedstock. Yet, in Europe biomass 
accounts for half of its total energy requirements, 
suggesting a global potential for improvement. Absolute 
zero emissions would require a conversion of existing 
fossil fuel-based combined heat and power systems to 
electrical power processes. Given the constraint on non-
emitting electricity availability required by chapter 1, then 
after complete electrification, paper production would be 
reduced by  approximately 80% of current volumes, to be 
consistent with UK targets.
Textiles
Most energy uses in the textile industry have already been 
electrified. However, leather production (which depends 
on cows) would not be compatible with Absolute Zero for 
the same reasons given for beef earlier. As washing, drying 
and ironing account for more than half of the energy uses 
for most clothing textiles, the industry could promote 
fabrics that need no ironing and support a reduction in the 
frequencies of washing and drying.
Engineering composites
Novel nano-materials offer promising properties, which 
could enable the substitution of some metals across 
different applications. However, the current total volume 
of these materials could probably fit into a water bottle. 
For this reason, it seems unlikely that these materials will 
have any value in reducing demand for the bulk materials 
by 2050.
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Figure 2.16: UK polymer applications (Mt/ year)
Key Message: Because of the emissions associated with their production, cement and new steel 
cannot be produced with zero emissions. Steel can be recycled effectively, but we need urgent 
innovation to find a cement supply. Under the conditions of Absolute Zero, the availability of most 
other materials will be proportion to the amount of non-emitting electricity available to the sector.
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2.3 Resource Efficiency in 
Construction
Most emissions associated with the construction arise due 
to the use of materials: the process of erecting buildings 
and infrastructure requires little energy compared with 
making the required materials, which are predominantly 
steel and cement. Under the conditions of Absolute 
Zero, all steel used in construction will be from recycling 
- which is largely the case already in the USA, and poses 
no significant challenge. However, as discussed in the 
previous section, the industry must learn to make use 
of considerably less cement. A parsimonious use will 
make the transition to Absolute Zero possible without 
putting the material industry under impossible strain. 
Furthermore, all efficiency gains in one material usually 
cause reduction in the use of the other, because lower 
loads always translate to lower structural needs. Figure 
2.17 shows the current uses of cement in the UK as a guide 
to the search for material efficiencies.
The causes of material inefficiency in construction are 
relatively well understood. The most common is over-
specification. The amount of steel in a typical floor of a 
steel-framed building is about twice what the structural 
requirements would dictate. This is because the choice of 
steel beams or steel reinforcement in concrete slabs is not 
fully optimised and because the decking (the thickness 
and type of floor slab) is typically oversized.
In current UK construction of steel-framed buildings, 
on average the steel is over-specified by a factor of two, 
even after accounting for our conservative safety factors. 
This does not mean that it would be possible to half the 
amount of steel, be we estimated that it was possible to 
save at least 15% of the mass of steel with no loss in service 
or safety. The deckings, are also oversized: the thickness 
of the concrete layer is larger than required, and the steel 
plate supporting the concrete in composite construction is 
frequently double the required thickness.
The building codes currently only specify the minimum 
amount of material to be used (including the margin 
of safety). But they could also enforce an upper limit, 
adding an “and no more” clause. There is also no existing 
benchmark to compare the embodied energy of the 
materials in a building per square metre of but this would 
help drive the efficiency of structural design.
In addition to these sources of over-specification, buildings 
are often designed for much higher loads than they will 
ever bear: gravity loading in buildings, predominantly 
from people, is specified to a far higher level than the 
physical proximity of groups of people could allow or that 
ventilation systems could sustain for life in the building. An 
overestimate of design loading leads directly to material 
being wasted in buildings. We do not routinely measure 
loading in buildings, and therefore a research effort 
is needed. Measuring loading in our buildings, would 
provide lessons from our existing buildings to transform 
structural design efficiency.
When specifying the vibration behaviour of buildings, 
which governs their “feel,” engineers usually exceed the 
requirements of our building codes. However, in use this 
feel is usually governed by the choice of flooring and the 
location of partitions, but designers usually ignore those 
factors, which are not set when the structural  frame is 
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Figure 2.17: Current patterns of cement use in the UK (kT/yr)
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chosen. Therefore, a lot of effort goes into making stiff 
buildings, which require more material and which may be 
entirely wasted. Better methods of predicting the feel of 
buildings would help guide design towards more efficient 
outcomes. 
A further driver of inefficiency in our use of materials in 
construction, independent of over-specification, is the 
choice of structural form. The choice of the grid (the 
spacing between columns) is the most important factor 
in the CO2 intensity of construction, yet there is little 
awareness of its importance. The carbon intensity of a 
building could double if very long spans are specified in 
preference to shorter ones, even when the users of such 
buildings frequently install partitions to sub-divide over-
large rooms. 
Scheming tools, which help guide early design towards a 
suitable architectural form are being developed. Currently, 
a designer is faced with a staggering array of options, not 
obviously different from each other, and will be naturally 
inclined to choose one with which they have experience. 
This is probably the cause of the over-design of decking. As 
the number of options grows – for example with growing 
enthusiasm for timber construction – the number of 
options in design will keep expanding, and designers may 
not be able to realise the promise of new constructions 
methods New scheming tools to support their decisions 
can halve the material requirements in construction.                            
The regularity of structures is also a currently 
underestimated source of in-efficiency: regular grids 
can be up to 20% more efficient than more complicated 
layouts. Novel tools can help structural designer make 
the right choices early in their projects, and link the 
choice of architectural form to the best currently available 
technology, as well as giving a context which may support 
architects to choose more efficient forms.
Resource efficiency can also be improved by using 
optimised structural members (slabs, beams, columns). 
Prismatic structural members in either concrete or steel 
are highly wasteful, because maximum stress in such 
members will only occur at one location along the entire 
length. Modern manufacturing processes can be used 
to specify appropriate structural shapes (e.g. fig. 2.18.) 
Even when designing flat concrete slabs, the pattern 
of reinforcement is rarely optimised, in part because a 
complex reinforcement pattern would increase the odds 
of errors on the construction site. New products such as 
reinforcement mats which have been tailored for specific 
site and can be simply unrolled have appeared, but they 
are not yet fully integrated in the design process of the 
structural design firms. 
Finally using alternative construction material at scale will 
require considerable changes in design habits. Engineered 
timber, if it lives up to its promise, will probably take its 
place besides steel and concrete as a standard frame 
material. However, engineers are only now being trained 
to design with timber, and it will take time before it can 
be used broadly. The trade-off between building tall 
(probably using high-carbon materials) with low transport 
requirements, and building low-rise (using low-carbon 
materials) but with higher transport requirements in a 
more sprawling approach, needs to be explored.
Steel production, even using a fully recycled route is 
energy intensive. It would require less energy to re-use 
beams rather than recycling them by melting. Currently, 
steel reuse is only a marginal practice, mostly because 
steel fabrication is an efficient, streamlined process which 
relies on beams being standardised products. It would 
be possible to increase the rate of reuse if legislation was 
adapted to help the recertification of steel beams, but more 
importantly the construction value chain must develop to 
accommodate the collection and reconditioning of beams 
to make them ready for re-fabrication.
Together, these material efficiency techniques can 
considerably reduce the need for materials in construction. 
This is vital to reduce the requirement for cement 
production to manageable levels. Putting into place all of 
the material efficiency techniques described here would 
allow us to keep meeting the needs in fig. 2.17 with the 
cement supply implied by the second of fig. 2.12a and thus 
to meet the challenge of Absolute Zero.
Key Message: Construction uses half of all steel and all cement, but has developed to use them 
inefficiently.  The requirements for materials in construction could be reduced to achieve Absolute 
Zero by avoiding over-specification and over-design, by structural otpimisation and with re-use.
Figure 2.18: Concrete beam made with fabric formwork
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2.4 Resource efficiency in 
manufacturing
The manufacturing of basic materials into products and 
goods is a major source of greenhouse gas emissions. 
For most products, manufacturing processes themselves 
cause a relatively small fraction of a product’s total 
embodied emissions, compared to the material input – see 
Fig 2.19. However, constraints caused by manufacturing 
practices strongly influence both the material input, and 
emissions caused by the product during its use. Therefore, 
under the conditions of Absolute Zero, major changes in 
manufacturing are needed; driven not just by changes up 
and downstream of the sector, but also by the need for 
greater resource efficiency within it. 
These changes have some impact on all products, but a 
critical priority in planning the delivery of Absolute Zero 
is to focus effort on the sectors with most impact. Having 
recognised that material production drives most current 
industrial emissions, figure 2.20 allocates the energy use 
in the first column of fig. 2.19 to applications to reveal the 
specific target sectors where material demand reduction 
is essential. Section 2.2 focused on construction, the single 
biggest user, and the strategies described there are relevant 
also to the non-cement components of infrastructure. But 
the figure clearly prioritises vehicles, industrial equipment 
and packaging for most attention.
Responding to changed material 
availability
In section 2.2 we saw that the availability of materials 
which today directly emit greenhouse gases in their 
production will be reduced by 2050.  This includes major 
raw materials such as steel from iron ore and cement, 
and multiple products of the chemical industry including 
F-gases, solvents, lubricants, and certain types of plastics. 
The knock-on effects for manufacturing are huge: 
Lubrication is critical for much of manufacturing; from 
metal forming, to motors, pumps and compressors; but 
almost all current commercial lubricants are derived 
from fossil fuels and directly emit greenhouse gases by 
oxidation either in production or use and so – by a strict 
definition of absolute zero – are ruled out. 
Similarly, solvents which emit Volatile Organic Compounds 
cannot be used. Yet these play a significant role in 
many industries, including paper coating, degreasing, 
printing and textiles, but also in coating or painting 
manufactured goods. Alternatives will be prized and their 
use widely expanded by 2050. Currently most steel used in 
manufacturing derives from iron ore; recycled steel is used 
almost exclusively in construction. New methods will be 
needed to shape, certify and steel derived from recycled 
sources. Processes will need greater tolerance to input 
variation. 
Whilst cement and concrete are not widely used in 
manufactured goods, they are of course ubiquitous in 
industrial floors, machine foundations and the like: placing 
a significant constraint on future factories at a time when 
flexibility and adaptability is key.  
Meeting changed product 
requirements
By 2050 and beyond the product and composition of many 
manufacturing industries will be significantly different. For 
example, Chapter 1 anticipated a 3-fold increase in non-
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emitting electricity generation over the next 30 years which 
means that the need for energy storage will sky-rocket. 
Section 2.1 predicted major shifts in demand for transport 
equipment: large uptake in electric vehicles and an end to 
plane or ship building. Similarly, widespread electrification 
of domestic and industrial heating will require a massive 
increase associated equipment such as heat pumps.  A 
shift to vegetarian diets would change the food industry 
significantly. Increased consumption of processed meat 
substitutes with lower emissions embodied in the food 
inputs, would require new processing capability and could 
need more energy in processing.   
The scale of material and resource input to enable 
these changes is significant; looking at wind electricity 
generation alone, increasing capacity at the rate predicted 
creates the opportunity for a substantial increase UK 
industrial output. On the other hand, Section 2.1 anticipates 
that by 2050 consumers will require products that live for 
longer and can be used more intensively. This will present 
manufacturers with the challenge of producing higher 
quality, higher value products. These may be individually 
more materially intensive but, with a reduction in total 
volume of sales, manufacturers will see a reduction in their 
total throughput. 
Improving resource efficiency
In a world with much-reduced primary energy availability 
manufacturers will need to make a step change in resource 
efficiency; both in material and energy input.   
Material efficiency
Various material efficiency measures are technically 
possible in the manufacturing of goods, components 
and equipment, including the reduction of process scrap, 
optimised component design and re-use or re-purposing 
of components. Large emission savings are possible by 
reducing process scrap.  In machining up to 90% of material 
can be wasted. For example, machining of aerospace fan 
blades from solid titanium can produce 90% waste in the 
form of machining chips. The paper industry produces pulp 
residue as waste containing high cellulose fibre and high 
calcium oxide, both of which can be used in fired clay brick 
production. Other uses are for land-filling, incineration, 
use in cement plants and brickworks, agricultural use and 
compost, anaerobic treatment and recycling.
The automotive industry in the UK generated 0.5% of the 
total commercial and industrial waste in the UK, at 1.85 
million tonnes, 41% of which is metallic, 28% is mixed 
ordinary waste, 8% chemical and medical waste, and the 
remainder mineral, paper, wood and plastic.  Many nascent 
technologies have been proposed that could reduce 
process scrap such as additive manufacturing, precision 
casting or forging and so on. However, the significant 
variation in performance between companies illustrated 
in fig. 2.22 suggests that the problem is just as much in the 
management of component and manufacturing design 
processes.
Shape optimisation of components could further reduce 
the material requirements of manufacturing. Whereas a 
given component - whether it is food or beverage can, 
drive shaft, or a structural beam – would often ideally have 
variable thickness along its length, or a hollow interior, 
current manufacturing process are not set up to produce 
such features.  Material savings could be achieved by 
the development of new manufacturing processes: the 
economies of scale promote production of components 
with uniform cross-sections, but optimising material use 
would require a distribution, and new computer-controlled 
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equipment can facilitate this change. Functional grading 
– generating different mechanical properties in different 
parts of the component - or using higher strength or 
lighter materials can also contribute. 
Changes of the nature described have all been 
demonstrated at differing technical ‘readiness’ but 
their deployment requires large disruptive changes 
in management practices, skills and manufacturing 
processes. 
Energy efficiency
Direct energy use in manufacturing will need to reduce if 
electricity supply is restricted to zero-carbon sources by 
2050. Some of this reduction could be achieved by energy 
efficiency. In the UK, the use of energy in downstream 
industries is dominated by low temperature process 
heating, space heating and motors, with a long tail of other 
uses as shown in fig 2.21. Recent estimates suggest that it 
may be possible to quarter electricity consumption over 
the next 10-15 years with the appropriate deployment of 
conventional technology such as motor drives, pump and 
compressed air efficiency measures, and the use of heat 
pumps. 
Product standards
Many positive changes are already occurring and many 
others seem both technically feasible and cost-saving in 
the long run.  To deliver the rapid pace of improvement 
needed we propose that stretching and imaginative 
embodied emissions standards are phased in for almost 
all manufactured product and imposed equally on UK 
manufacturers and imported goods. Such standards 
are already widely familiar within manufacturing, 
whether for safety, inter-operability or use-phase energy 
efficiency. These must now be extended to embodied 
emissions and – as matter of urgency - be attached to the 
major programmes of industrial product development 
delivering the widespread changes in energy, transport 
equipment, food infrastructure. If these are imposed fairly 
on traded goods, it would create a great incentive for UK 
manufacturers to develop and benefit from the novel 
products and processes compatible with Absolute Zero.
Fig. 2.23 summarises the analysis of this and the previous 
section: the energy required to power UK manufacturing 
and construction, once electrified, can be reduced by 
a combination of changes to product specification and 
design, product longevity and process efficiency.
Key Message: Driven by inventive new embodied emissions standards, manufacturing will adapt 
to three major changes: 1) reduced availability of current inputs, 2) radically different product 
composition and requirements, and 3) the existential need for improved resource efficiency.
Figure 2.23: Reducing energy use in manufacturing and construction with incremental technologies or reducing demand 
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2.5 Breakthrough Technologies
The purpose of this report is to focus attention on how we 
can really deliver zero emissions by 2050, using today’s 
technologies and incremental changes from them. This 
is because breakthrough technologies take a long time 
to deploy - as shown in the box story on page 10 - and 
we don’t have enough time left.  However, beyond 2050, 
new technologies will emerge to transform the energy 
and industrial landscape, and some of them will be those 
under development today.  
The options surveyed on this page are therefore post-
mitigation technologies: after we have met Absolute Zero 
through complete electrification, a 60% cut in energy 
demand and the elimination of emitting activities without 
substitutes, these technologies may later grow to be 
significant.
Generation
Of the non-emitting technologies in current use, hydro-
electricity is difficult to expand, due to geography, and as 
discussed earlier, the use of biomass for food will exclude 
its use at scale for energy generation. However, nuclear 
power could expand. Following the Fukushima disaster 
in 2011, Japan closed its nuclear reactors and Germany 
decided to move permanently away from them. However, 
France continues to generate much of its power from 
nuclear power, and in the UK, Hinckley Point C is under 
construction although this is a big, costly project with 
uncertain completion date. New “small” modular reactors 
are also under discussion. At present, none are operating 
world-wide, with two under construction, but potentially 
beyond 2050, these could make a significant addition to 
generation. More remotely, nuclear fusion which has been 
under development since the 1940’s is still decades away 
from generating any energy even at laboratory scale, so 
cannot be included in planning.
Beyond wind and solar power, the other renewable 
generation technologies under development are 
geothermal, tidal and wave power. Geothermal generation 
which operates at scale in Iceland, New Zealand and Costa 
Rica is unlikely to be significant in the UK and is operated 
only at very small scale. Two large tidal power stations 
operate world-wide, in France and Korea, at a scale of 
about a quarter of a gigawatt, but although the Severn 
Estuary has been explored as an attractive site, the UK has 
no current plans for a first installation. World-wide there 
is no significant generation based on wave-power. As a 
result, while these are important areas for development, it 
is not possible to anticipate any significant new generation 
from these new renewable technologies.
Energy storage and transfer
Wind and solar power are intermittent, so create a 
challenge of matching the availability of electricity supply 
to demand for its use.  This can be addressed by storage 
(for example by batteries or the pumped hydro-station at 
Dinorwig) or by controlling demand to match availability, 
for example by allowing network operators to decide when 
domestic appliances and industrial processes can operate. 
There are already many developments in this area in the 
UK, and we assume that they can operate at sufficient 
scale in 2050 to prevent the need for excess generation.
Batteries can operate at large scale, but remain heavy. 
For static applications this is not a problem but for 
transport it is constraining: the battery accounts for 
around one quarter of the weight of a two-tonne Tesla 
Model S. Technology developers have therefore looked for 
alternative forms of energy storage to use in transport, and 
found two important options: hydrogen and ammonia. 
Hydrogen is currently produced mainly (95%) from fossil 
fuels by steam reforming methane, which leads to the 
release of a significant quantity of greenhouse gases 
offering no benefit as a form of energy storage. However, 
it can also be made from water by electrolysis, although 
as Figure 2.24 shows, this involves losses which depend 
on the application, but may be higher than those in the 
figure depending on the form of storage used. If, in future, 
we have an excess supply of electricity from non-emitting 
sources, we could use it to make hydrogen, which could 
then be used to power vehicles. 
Ammonia combustion for shipping may be available in 
the future, but it currently leads to the production of NOx, 
which is a powerful air pollutant. Additionally, ammonia 
is currently produced from fossil fuels, which results 
in emissions. Although it is possible to use fuel cells to 
produce ammonia using renewable electricity, there is 
currently no such process in commercial operation, and 
its implementation at scale would again be an additional 
burden to the decarbonisation of the power grid. 
One further opportunity for energy storage and transfer 
is through heat networks which capture “waste heat” from 
Figure 2.24: “Round-trip” eciency of hydrogen storage
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industrial processes and use it, for example, for domestic 
heating.  Around 1% of the UK’s homes are heated by heat 
networks, but expanding this number has proved difficult 
due to the high cost of the required infrastructure. 
Emissions capture
Although not all related to the energy system, several 
novel approaches have been proposed to capture carbon 
emissions. Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is used to a 
very small extent by the oil industry to increase production 
through the process called “Enhanced Oil Recovery”: 
compressed CO2 is pumped into the rocks in which oil is 
stored to drive more of it to the well. 
For over twenty years CCS has been proposed as the key 
technology to allow continued generation of electricity 
from gas and coal.  However, the only power plant operating 
with CCS – the Boundary Dam project at Saskatchewan 
in Canada, a very small 0.1GW power station – does not 
produce transparent figures on performance, and when 
last reported on by researchers at MIT, was capturing but 
then releasing its emissions. This technology, despite the 
very well-funded lobby supported by the incumbent oil 
and gas industry, is far from mature or ready to be included 
in meaningful mitigation plans. 
Plans for “Bio-energy CCS” or “BECCS” claim to be 
carbon negative – burning biomass and storing carbon 
permanently underground – are entirely implausible, due 
to the shortage of biomass, and should not be considered 
seriously.
Carbon Capture and Utilisation (CCU) has become a key 
technology promoted by the industrial operators of 
conventional plant, particularly the steel and cement 
industry, but it requires significant additional electrical 
input, which clearly will not be available before 2050. 
In future CCU allow conventional steel and cement 
production to re-start, but only when we have excess non-
emitting electricity. 
In fact, the idea of carbon capture and storage requires no 
new technology, as it could be developed by increasing 
the area of land committed to forestry or “afforestation”. 
We aren’t short of tree-seeds, and instead the world is 
experiencing deforestation under the pressure of needing 
land for agriculture to provide food. Planting new trees is 
the most important technology on this page, and does not 
require any technological innovation.
Industrial processes
In addition to its potential application in energy storage, 
hydrogen creates a further opportunity in industrial 
processes because it is sufficiently reactive that it could 
be used to reduce iron ore to pig iron without releasing 
carbon emissions in the reaction. Steel has been produced 
at laboratory scale by hydrogen, and pilot plants are now 
being developed to demonstrate higher scale production. 
However, it will only be consistent with a zero-emissions 
future when the hydrogen is produced with non-emitting 
electricity, and we have no spare non-emitting electricity 
to allow this to happen.
Beyond 2050, the incumbent operators of blast furnace 
steel making, have several process concepts for making 
new steel from iron ore without emissions. The three main 
areas being discussed are: separating CO2 from other blast 
furnace gases, and applying CCS to it;  using hydrogen 
instead of coke to convert iron ore to steel; separating 
CO2 from other blast furnace gases, and using it for other 
purposes via CCU. All three routes show rich technological 
opportunities, but will not be operating at scale before 
2050.
Flight and shipping
Electric planes are under development, but difficult: 
the limited rate of improvement in solar cell efficiency 
shown in fig. 1.10 suggests that solar power will be never 
be sufficient for multi-passenger commercial flight. 
Meanwhile, we have yet to find a sufficient breakthrough 
in battery development to anticipate sufficient light-
weight storage. The most promising route appears to be 
synthetic jet-fuel - which, inevitably, will be important 
only after a substantial increase in non-emitting electricity 
generation.  
The decarbonisation of shipping is difficult with current 
technologies. Although short-distance shipping can 
be electrified using battery-powered engines, long-
distance shipping requires a combustion process. Nuclear 
propulsion of ships offers a viable alternative to current 
long-distance shipping and it is already used, although 
almost only in military vessels. Some commercial operators 
are currently exploring the opportunity to add sails to 
conventional ships to reduce their diesel requirements.
Key Message: The problem with breakthrough technologies is not our shortage of ideas, but 
the very long time required to take a laboratory-scale idea through the technical and commercial 
development cycle before it can begin to capture a substantial share of the world market.
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Absolute Zero is a journey
Action on climate change depends on the co-operation 
of three “players” illustrated in fig. 3.1. The public, the 
government and businesses must act jointly to transform 
the way we produce, consume and live. Large sections of 
the public are increasingly concerned with climate change, 
and some take individual actions such as eating less meat, 
looking for locally sourced products or taking the plane 
less often. Politically, this has translated to a growth in 
the support for Green parties across Europe. Businesses, 
driven by the demands of the public and driven to 
efficiency are seeking more efficient production methods 
and developing products consistent with a zero-emissions 
future. Governments embrace the drives of the public and 
businesses to grow the economy and gain votes.
Despite this goodwill towards change, the important 
transformations outlined in this report do not seem to 
be happening, or at least not at a sufficient pace. A key 
reason for this is that these transformations are attempted 
without the required trust building between the actors 
which can make them successful. The actors of change are 
in effect locked in a prisoners’ dilemma, and the changes 
proposed make it seem like a static version of the game. 
The prisoner’s dilemma is a theoretical game where the 
best outcome for the players cannot be achieved if the 
players only follow their own best interests. There are 
many variants to the story but in substance it runs like 
this: two bandits just successfully robbed a bank and were 
caught soon after for some minor offence. They are kept in 
separate cells, and each is told their accomplice has also 
been caught. They can defect and accuse their accomplice 
of the robbery, in which case they’ll get at least a reduced 
sentence, or they can cooperate and refuse to accuse each 
other. Should they both defect, they’ll both have a reduced 
sentence. Should they both cooperate, they’ll both have a 
small fine, should one cooperate and the other defect, the 
defector will go out free and the cooperator will get a full 
sentence.
Game theory predicts they should both defect: indeed, 
there is no outcome from cooperating which cannot be 
improved by defecting… Every day, all of us are faced 
with many such dilemmas – but every day we cooperate 
rather than defect! This is because the prisoner’s dilemma 
when played over and over is a completely different game 
which is won by achieving cooperation. When considering 
the so-called iterated prisoner’s dilemma, it’s not single 
moves but strategies which matter. This is a well-studied 
problem, and the winning strategies which achieve 
cooperation share a number of basic characteristics: they 
punish defectors, they reward cooperators, they are simple 
enough that they can be understood by observers. Other 
research looking at how humans play in games compared 
to the predictions of game theory suggests another crucial 
quality of winning strategies: the cooperative strategies 
must also be fair. Marginally cooperative moves will be 
treated as defections.
Similarly, the transformation required for climate change 
mitigation needs to be played out like the repeated game, 
and not seen as a single huge step which will most likely 
be resisted and fail. Fortunately, three-player games favour 
cooperation somewhat, unlike the two-player variant. 
Unfortunately, having more players may drive each one 
individually to try and delay making changes. To achieve 
the scale of transformation required, small incremental 
changes are the immediately necessary steps to build and 
reinforce trust between the actors.
3. Transitions:
Key Message: No one actor can bring about Absolute Zero.  Delivering it is a journey depending on 
co-operative  action by individuals, businesses and governments acting on good information
Figure 3.1: The three “players” of climate mitigation
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Case study: re-using steel
Currently, most of the steel from demolitions is recycled. 
There is nothing else which can be done with the reinforcing 
steel of concrete, but steel beams having standard sections 
and not being  damaged from their service as structural 
elements could be reused. If not directly, after some sand-
blasting and the fitting of new connexions the beams are 
as good as new. Most of the research on the barriers to 
steel reuse focuses on the certification problem: steel to be 
used in construction needs to be certified, but the process 
of obtaining certification assumes the beam is coming out 
of a mill and is not transposable to already used beams. 
However, is is possible for a small price premium to test the 
beams and guarantee that they have all the appropriate 
properties.
What we found is that the key obstacle in the supply chain 
was that steel reuse puts the buyer of the building wanting 
to use steel from reuse and the fabricator responsible 
for the conditioning of beams in a prisoner’s dilemma. 
Reconditioning the steel takes approximately twice the 
amount of time to condition a new steel beam direct 
from the foundry. Although the fabricator can charge 
for this time, a project being abandoned – always a risk 
in construction – will translate to large losses. Therefore, 
all projects that we could study where the fabricator was 
not part of the planning, failed. Our proposed solution is 
for steel stockist to take on the job of reconditioning and 
re-certifying steel so that the fabricators need never know 
whether the steel is from reuse or not. Acting as a trusted 
intermediary, this would avoid the project failures due to 
fabricators not wanting to shoulder all the risk. The upfront 
investment could be helped by government grants, and 
we showed that this would be overall profitable.
Case study: Cycling in the Netherlands
After the second world war, the Netherlands had, like the 
rest of Europe embraced cars as a symbol of freedom and 
mobility and had built highways and roads to accommodate 
this new transport mode. In 1971 alone, 300 children died 
in the Netherlands from accidents involving cars, leading 
to widespread protests. In 1973-74 the oil crisis caused 
oil shortages, leading the Dutch government to look for 
strategies which would lower the oil dependency.  The 
protesters were demanding a return to the biking culture 
which had been an important part of Dutch habits until 
the war, and the government took this occasion to launch 
a number of bike-friendly initiatives: a number of car-less 
Sundays in the years. Some city centres were made car-
free. These moves proved popular and were followed by 
the construction of bike-specific infrastructure.
From the mid-70s onwards, bikes were integrated in urban 
planning decisions, meaning not only cycles paths being 
built, but traffic-calmed streets would be favoured, and 
bike parking be available at convenient locations, and 
bike traffic be integrated in the general public transport 
infrastructure. As the bicycle is seen as a symbol of the 
Netherlands, it was possible to pass more stringent 
legislation: for example since 1992, in an accident, it is 
always the motorist’s insurance which is liable for the 
costs in the Netherlands.  Safe interaction with bikes is 
part of passing one’s driving license. As the popularity of 
bikes grow in the 90s and 2000, larger investments in bike 
infrastructure became possible with the support of the 
public, leading to even more bikes being ridden.
Overall, the current Dutch biking culture is the result of a 
long process where multiple changes to legislation, habits 
and infrastructure were self-reinforcing, leading to today’s 
situation where the Netherlands is Europe’s leader in km 
cycled.
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3.1 Individuals – at home and at work
Protesters and school strikers have increased our 
awareness of the need to address climate change. An 
individual wanting to reduce their personal emissions can 
find a wealth of information on social media, websites and 
podcasts detailing actions they could take. Behavioural 
changes required to deliver zero emissions by 2050 are 
already being practised by some people in some places: 
some people already choose not to fly, to be vegan, to 
car share, to lower the temperatures in their homes and 
offices. If large scale social amplification could occur, as it 
did with the ‘Me Too’ movement, surely a cultural change 
could occur to enable zero emissions by 2050?
Although public awareness of the need to act has increased, 
the UK has not meaningfully reduced its resource use in 
recent decades, with the International Energy Agency 
reporting total final energy consumption has reduced 
by only 7% since 1990 levels. Individuals continue to use 
nearly as much energy as they did 30 years ago, suggesting 
that existing strategies to motivate individuals to use less 
energy are not generating the scale of impact required.
Social norms and individual behaviours
There is a misalignment between the scale of actions 
recommended by government (e.g. energy conservation) 
and those most commonly performed by individuals (e.g. 
recycling) . Actions which can have a big effect, such as 
better insulation in houses and not flying, are being 
ignored in favour of small, high profile actions, such as 
not using plastic straws. This is enabling individuals to 
feel satisfied that they are ‘doing their bit’ without actually 
making the lifestyle changes required to meet the zero 
emissions target. If large scale social change is to be 
successful a new approach is needed.
Whilst the thought of society taking radical, meaningful 
steps to meet zero emission targets could be criticised 
for being idealistic, we can learn from historical cultural 
changes. Not long ago, smoking cigarettes was encouraged 
and considered to be acceptable in public spaces that 
children frequented, drink-driving was practiced with 
such regularity that it killed 1000 people per year in 
the UK, and discrimination based on sexual orientation 
was written into law. These behaviours now seem 
reprehensible, showing society is capable acknowledging 
the negative consequences of certain behaviours and 
socially outlawing their practice. Focus should therefore 
be centred on expediting the evolution of new social 
norms with confidence that change can happen.
Evidence from behavioural science, and the long 
experience in public health of changing behaviours 
around smoking and alcohol, shows that information 
alone is not enough to change behaviour. To make the 
types of changes described in this report, we will have to 
think more broadly on the economic and physical contexts 
in which designers, engineers and members of the public 
make decisions that determine carbon emissions. At the 
same time, clear, accurate and transparent information on 
problems and the efficacy of proposed solutions is essential 
for maintaining public support for policy interventions.
The phrasing of communication is also important. 
Messages framed about fear and climate crisis have 
been found to be ineffective at motivating change. The 
longevity of the challenge of reducing emissions, and the 
lack of immediate or even apparent consequences of small 
individual actions mean it is challenging to link to them 
to the large-scale climate crisis. This allows individuals to 
make decisions which contrast with their desire to reduce 
emissions. Scientific description is not always the most 
effective means of communication, and language used to 
promote zero emissions should no longer focus on an ‘eco-
friendly’ and ‘green’ lexicon, but rather candid descriptions 
of actions that appeal to human fulfilment. Evidence from 
time-use studies shows that human fulfilment does not 
strictly depend on using energy – the activities we enjoy 
the most are the ones with the lowest energy requirements. 
Consumers can be satisfied in a zero emissions landscape. 
Individuals and industry
If net-zero targets are to be met, all of society needs to 
change, not just those motivated by the environment. 
Therefore, as well as persuading and supporting individuals 
to change with environmental campaigning and one-off 
sustainability projects, industry should embed a net-zero 
emissions strategy into business-as-usual, only offering 
products and services which meet their consumers’ welfare 
needs without emissions.
This change will be driven by individuals acting in their 
professional capacity, as managers, designers, engineers, 
cost consultants, and so on. A structural engineer designing 
a concrete-framed building has vastly more influence over 
carbon emissions through their design decisions at work 
than through their personal lifestyle. Therefore, as well as 
the transitions in businesses discussed in the following 
section, this section applies also to individuals at work.
Key Message: Changes to social norms and individual behaviours can be positively framed to 
appeal to human fulfilment. Motivated individuals can be as effective at work as at home.
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3.2 Transitions in businesses
Many of the opportunities and changes identified in the 
first sections of this report will involve businesses making 
changes to the types of technologies they use, or the way 
they use them. But this type of change can be difficult to 
motivate. This section examines why this is, and discusses 
the role of incentives, market pull, standardisation and 
collaboration in achieving the change required. 
Challenges in changing technologies 
for zero emissions
We are surrounded by a constant stream of innovation in 
technology in some areas – but in others, some industries 
have been slow to respond and to integrate relevant 
innovations into their operating models. In general, the 
introduction of new generations of products set the 
cadence of technology insertion. When new manufacturing 
technologies and processes are introduced, they are 
generally second-order technology insertions: that is, 
they are often not central to the functionality of the next 
product but are driven instead by improvements in cost, 
quality and logistics.
In such cases thorough assessment of technology merits, 
maturity and readiness are carried out, especially where 
change represents some form of risk. Without the driver 
of a new product launch, and associated new revenue 
stream, firms have displayed a risk-averse attitude towards 
significant technology-stack transformation. This is 
particularly true in instances of low product launch cadence 
and safety critically. In such cases, novel technologies have 
had to pass the test of time before being considered for 
full deployment. 
Another reason behind gradual technology adoption 
is the lack of propensity to invest, especially in highly 
established industries where the cost of new capital would 
be prohibitive.
Incentives for technology innovation
Using the “carrot and stick” analogy, it is easy to understand 
that innovation can have a difficult time permeating into 
an organisation without the right type of leverage and 
motivation. Governments can impose additional taxes, 
policies and regulations to achieve the desired changes 
but this could be short lived with the next batch of policy 
changes. Emissions and energy caps can be seen as a 
“stick” but financial rewards and customer-valued green 
credentials will be perceived as a “carrot”.
Ideally there should be a market pull that is driven by 
the end customer. Organisations are more likely to 
adopt innovation and technology when there is a direct 
correlation to increased revenue and returns. They are also 
more likely to pursue targets that result in products and 
services that use less resources but still valued equally or 
greater by the customer.
Consumers are more aware of the macro effects of their 
purchasing choices and there is a move towards companies 
that have the same brand values. For a business, this can 
be hard to benefit from, as these qualities are not easily 
visible to the end customer. As well as changing the 
manufacturing process and business practises towards 
a less carbon intensive model, they also have to spend 
money on advertising and branding so potential customer 
are informed of these less visible changes and benefits.
The achievement of absolute zero almost certainly requires 
life extension and better utilisation of certain categories of 
product, but with progressive insertion of more sustainable 
manufacturing and through-life engineering technologies 
throughout life in service. This position is contrary to the 
situation described above, and requires a new mechanism 
to establish a cadence of positive technological changes. 
The most obvious means of establishing such a cadence 
via public intervention would be the establishment, and 
acceptance, of some form of ‘roadmap’ which sets out 
progress, time bound improvement targets.
The role of standardisation
Standardisation can play a significant role in reducing 
industrial and domestic energy use and CO2 production. 
In many industries, standardisation and sharing best 
practice have paved the way to less resource duplication 
and greater customer experience. An example that is often 
mentioned is the light bulb but a more modern example 
would be the phone charger. In the early days of the mobile 
phone industry, not only did every manufacturer have 
their own chargers but every model had its own connector 
type. Once customer habits were analysed, it was found 
that customers wanted to upgrade to a new phone every 
few years, therefore very quickly there would be a build-up 
of useless chargers and connectors ending up in landfills. 
Several of the major manufactures developed a standard 
charger and connector that would be used for all models 
going forward. This had 4 main benefits:
• Reduction in unnecessary charger variation and 
legacy part production.
• Increased customer experience as phones could be 
charged with any charger and no longer limited to 
one connector.
• Phone manufacturers diverting funds and resources 
away from charger and connector design into other 
parts of the product that were more valued by the 
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customer.
• Users investing in higher quality chargers that could 
be used for years without needing replacement and a 
reduction in E-waste.
In other industries current practice often requires 
specialised components and parts that are designed 
specifically for their intended use. With standardisation 
comes the reduction in design flexibility. In an already 
saturated market place, businesses are trying to 
differentiate their products and services form one another. 
Customisation currently allows them to achieve these 
goals, but as discussed above, in future the environmental 
benefits of standardisation could provide an alternative 
source of differentiation.
It is possible that the progressive roll-out of standards 
over time could form a central and tangible element of any 
roadmap for achieving absolute zero. The development 
of standards which drive positive change would however 
be entirely reliant on some key principals of backward 
compatibility, such that the implementation of each new 
standard avoids immediate obsolescence of existing 
assets.
Making collaboration work
The achievement of absolute zero seems to be beyond 
the ability of individual firms, and even nations, to enact. 
It requires a level of cooperation which has perhaps only 
been seen during times of war.
Moving beyond the purely competition model and 
integrating some learning from the collaboration 
model can be beneficial to competitors as well as the 
environment. As well as eliminating obvious duplication of 
resources, a new level of cooperation would be needed so 
that the benefits of shared learning can rapidly permeate 
through supply chains, and horizontally across sectors. 
This presents a more complex legal and organisational 
challenge to the traditional manufacturing and business 
model, but one which could create new opportunities for 
early adopters.
The necessary transition will incorporate the current move 
beyond the traditional manufacturing line to more flexible 
manufacturing for increased agility while taking a balanced 
and holistic planning approach to enable through life 
considerations to be made. The role of analysis in this 
model based on increased computing power, but also the 
carbon impact of data storage and transfer is a complex 
one. Gathering information on the whole manufacturing 
process from all participants in the supply chain and then 
analysing the results to produce the holistic resource 
usage is one of the ways to truly understand what goes 
into the final product. Insights from this information will 
allow for the development of a valid roadmap to absolute 
zero, but there are challenges to obtaining and using this 
information that will be discussed later, in section 3.4.
A look to the future
Technology innovation and change readiness is becoming 
a desirable quality. With shortening product life cycles, 
organisations need to adopt a more agile approach to 
respond to market needs. Catering to this consumer 
mentality has led to the production of lower quality 
products that fail in the time the consumer would be 
looking to upgrade or replace the product. An extension 
of through-life engineering approaches beyond ultra-
high capital value assets into more mainstream consumer 
products is needed. Essentially this means producing 
much higher quality products with parts that can be 
dismantled, retrieved and reused. Products could either be 
disassembled and reassembled with some modifications 
and resold or they could be cascaded down into a 
completely new product. This would require forward 
planning, standardisation and modular design thinking.
Organisational and inter-organisational culture will need 
to match the aspiration of absolute zero over time to 
become, itself the great incentive and driver of a positive 
cadence of change. No organisation can outrun their 
legacy, therefore a roadmap that commits them to real 
change while keeping the business profitable now and in 
the future is desirable.
This section has focused on technology transitions 
in existing businesses, but successful disruptive 
transformations often come from outsiders and new 
players. Therefore, support mechanisms also need to exist 
for new businesses bringing zero-carbon-compatible 
business models and production processes as an 
alternative to the status quo.
Key Message: Agreed roadmaps, new forms of market pull and collaboration are needed to spread 
the required technological innovation through industry.
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3.3 Action by Government 
The government will need to act to create the context in 
which the individual and supply-chain changes described 
in the previous sections can develop. There is also a 
strategic choice about the speed of transition which 
should be pursued. 
Figure 3.2 shows three potential paths for energy reduction 
to reach Absolute Zero in 2050. This is predicated on 
growth in the supply of energy from renewables growing 
at the rate indicated in figure 1.1. This means that demand 
has to reduce to 60% of its current level by 2050. Growth 
in energy use beyond 2050 will be driven by ongoing 
renewable and other carbon-free technologies.   The 
distinction between the pre-2050 and post-2050 analysis 
is that the steps taken to meet the 2050 target must rely on 
technologies which are already in existence, and have the 
clear mechanisms to be scaled, whereas post-2050 growth 
can reflect new technologies. The three potential paths 
for energy reduction reflect three different approaches, 
depending on the extent of delay. What these three paths 
do not show is that the cost or sacrifice needed for an 
extra percentage point reduction is not constant: initial 
reductions are likely to be much easier. This in turn implies 
that if the desire is to spread the cost of reduction equally 
over the 30 years to Absolute Zero, then the actual path 
needs to reflect a sharp early decline, as in the dashed red 
line.  
Absolute zero means two things: first, that no carbon 
can be produced by any industry or household; second, 
averaged across the economy, energy consumption must 
fall to 30% of its current level.  This distinction between the 
carbon reduction, which is an obligation on all industries, 
and an energy reduction which is on the average, leads 
to very different substitution possibilities: there are no 
substitutes for the reduction of carbon to zero, but there 
needs to be a mechanism for allocating scarce energy 
resources. Ensuring carbon is at zero is a regulation 
issue, with prohibitions on the use of carbon similar to 
prohibitions on the use of asbestos. Ensuring energy is cut 
in the aggregate requires an allocation mechanism, and 
the price of energy to reflect its scarcity. In such a scenario, 
the owners of the means of production of renewable 
energy will make very large profits. This in turn raises both 
efficiency and distributional issues. 
 We break the discussion into four components: first, on the 
possibilities for substitution away from Carbon and energy 
use across different sectors; second, on the impact on the 
types of job and the location of jobs; third, on the overall 
impact on output; and finally, on the implementation.
Production Substitution
At the heart of understanding the impact on the economy 
of Absolute Zero is an understanding of the substitution 
possibilities away from Carbon and energy in different 
industries and production processes.  
Section 2.3 discusses the options for the construction 
sector: the production of cement involves the emission of 
carbon and so cement in its current form cannot be used 
in construction. At present there is no alternative to the 
use of cement and so the construction industry has to 
radically change its production process or close. In this 
case, radically change means either reverting to using 
wood or other natural products (but this in turn limits the 
size of buildings and so the sector cannot continue as it 
is), or successfully developing the alternatives to current 
cement production described in Section 2.2, but this in 
turn limits the size of buildings and the sector cannot 
continue as it is. This has implications for the way in which 
businesses and households operate. Buildings need to be 
reused rather than rebuilt. On the other hand, it is not clear 
how the existing stock of buildings will be maintained, 
and the conclusion is that building space (residential and 
commercial) will have an ever increasing premium  
The difficulty of the construction industry highlights the 
impact on any assets being used in an industry where 
there are no substitutes for carbon – such as planes, or 
industrial plants. The value of these assets will be zero in 
2050 and this should directly affect the desire to invest in 
those assets now. This points to the implementation issue: 
realising the value will be zero in 2050 may encourage 
greater use in the run up to 2050 – for example, putting up 
new buildings at a much faster rate for the next 30 years, 
knowing that construction must then halt.  On the other 
hand, Figure 1.1 makes clear that the value of investment 
in processes of carbon-neutral energy production will 
increase sharply. 
Figure 3.2: Pathways of restraint and growth
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Jobs and Location
There are two key implications for how we live our lives: 
first, buildings will become much more expensive because 
the restrictions on building which generate substantial 
scarcities; second, transport  will become much more 
expensive because the limits on air travel will generate 
excess demand for other forms of transport. By expensive, 
we mean the direct costs to an individual or firm, but also 
indirect costs in terms of reduced quality. We would expect 
these two substantial changes to lead to pressure on the 
amount of space any one individual uses, and also where 
people choose to live and work. This points to increased 
centralisation, with growth in cities.
The wider problem with the changes in labour is knowing 
what type of labour or jobs will be in demand. Those who 
are starting secondary school now, in 2019, will be 43 in 
2050. Thinking about what education is appropriate for a 
very different set of industries is a key question. Should we 
still be training airplane pilots? Or aeronautical engineers? 
How are we training architects, civil engineers? Education 
decisions are far more persistent than capital investments. 
This in turn highlights the needs to take decisions on 
investments now where the lead times are very long or 
depreciation rates very low. 
Overall Impact on Output
Economic growth in the industrialised world has been 
associated with increasing energy use. Long-term growth 
rates will also be constrained by the rate at which energy 
production can grow which depends on the growth rate 
of renewables. The key question in the transition is how 
much will output decline to reach a level where only 30% 
of current energy is being used and no carbon is being 
produced. We have discussed the direct impact of this on 
the construction and transport sectors. What this misses 
is the inter-dependence of the non-emitting and emitting 
sectors. Specialisation in production and the substitution 
of energy for labour have been key drivers for growth 
and increased productivity. The open question is whether 
specialisation can still be achieved without the reliance on 
energy. 
These impacts on output will not be felt equally across 
the country. Industries are typically geographically 
concentrated – such as steel production – and this means 
that large shifts in production will have concentrated 
impacts. Rural or more isolated communities are likely to 
be disproportionately affected. The largest distributional 
impact, however, is intergenerational: the cost of hitting 
Absolute Zero will be borne by the current generation. 
Implementation
The changes in behaviour to achieve Absolute Zero are 
clearly substantial. In principle, these changes could be 
induced through changing prices and thus providing clear 
incentives for behaviour to change. The alternative is that 
the government prohibits certain types of behaviour and 
regulates on production processes. Given the difficulty 
for the government of knowing what production process 
to change or what options for innovation are available to 
companies, the natural decentralised solution is for the 
government to either put a price on carbon or to restrict 
its use directly. The push for Absolute Zero means the 
distinction between these two approaches is irrelevant: 
the price of carbon must be prohibitively large by 2050 to 
stop all demand.  In the run-up to 2050, the question is how 
fast must the price of carbon be increased, or equivalently, 
how fast must restrictions on the use of carbon be put 
in place. It is understanding this time-line for the price 
increase (or time-line for the strictness of restrictions on 
use) which is the key issue for the implementation. 
The underlying point is that any asset which uses carbon 
will have essentially zero value in 2050. This in turn may 
encourage greater use in the run up to 2050 – for example, 
putting up new buildings at a much faster rate for the next 
30 years, knowing that construction must then halt. This 
sort of response is clearly counter-productive: the climate 
problem is about the stock of carbon, rather than the flow.
A natural question in considering implementation of 
the 2050 is how to evaluate the cost to the economy of 
various measures. For example, how to compare the cost 
of installing solar panels to the cost of driving smaller cars. 
Individuals’ willingness to pay gives a measure of the value 
of installing solar panels (rather than take electricity from 
the grid) or the value of driving a small car (rather than a 
larger one with the same  functionality). 
Key Message: The effective price of carbon must be prohibitively large by 2050. A key issue for how 
to implement this is the timeline for how the price must grow (or restrictions must become more 
strict) from now to 2050.
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3.4 Information
Information has a critical role to play in guiding transition 
to absolute zero emissions. Data about our present 
situation is needed to prioritise change and innovation, 
to monitor progress, and to identify ‘bright spots’ of good 
practice. We also need to understand how the future 
might develop and how we can make choices now that are 
robust to future uncertainty. However, information alone 
is not sufficient to cause actual changes in behaviour, and 
we should be aware of lessons from behavioural science to 
maximise the effectiveness of information.
Information on the present
Understanding the current scale of our different activities 
that drive emissions is key to prioritising the behaviour 
changes and technical innovations that would most 
effectively lead to emissions reductions at the scale 
required. Put simply, the impact of a change (whether 
behavioural or technical) can be represented as:
Impact of change = Scale × Change in flow × Impact of flow
For example, in construction it is possible to use post- 
tensioned floor slabs in place of the standard slab types, 
to achieve a 20% reduction in cement use (the ‘change 
in flow’ of cement entering construction). However, this 
technique is only applicable to a fraction of all the floor 
slabs that are constructed (the ‘scale’), and the overall 
impact depends on the impact factor of the flow (in this 
case, GHG emissions per tonne of cement). Clearly, the 
overall impact of a change depends on all of these factors. 
An understanding of all three is critical to formulating a 
roadmap for change (Section 3.2) that can really reach 
absolute zero emissions. The same applies to research 
agendas, where there has been more research and 
policy interest in reducing food waste than on reducing 
meat consumption, despite the former contributing an 
estimated 1–2% to emissions and the latter an estimated 
50% . Data on how things are currently happening can also 
support change through identifying ‘bright spots’ where 
good practice is already happening .
Looking to the future
However, understanding the present is not enough. Many 
of the decisions that will influence emissions in 2050 must 
be made far in advance, such as designing buildings, 
investing in energy infrastructure and car manufacturing 
plants (Section 1). These decisions should ideally be 
robust to a wide range of possible future outcomes, 
such as faster- or slower-than- expected deployment of 
zero-carbon energy supplies, or higher or lower loading 
requirements for buildings in use. When this is not done 
well, the result is the situation described in Section 2.3, 
where structural designs are routinely excessively sized, 
leading to proportionally excessive carbon emissions. In 
contrast, it has been shown that an initially-smaller design 
that allows for reinforcement to be added to beams in 
future, if needed, would lead to lower lifetime emissions .
There are many possible pathways to zero emissions 
in 2050, and different reports can reach very different 
conclusions from by focusing on different scenarios. To 
provide clarity on our options to reaching Absolute Zero, 
we need to compare different proposals on a common 
basis and highlight the different starting assumptions 
that lead to different conclusions (see box story for an 
example).
Getting better information
Despite these important roles that information about our 
use of resources plays, the data we have is patchy and 
disconnected. There are two basic ways the situation can 
be improved: collecting better data, and making smarter 
use of the limited data we do have.
The UK Government’s Resources and Waste Strategy has 
recognised that ‘lack of reliable data on the availability 
of secondary materials is cited by industry as a barrier to 
their use’, and proposes a National Materials Datahub to 
address this issue by providing ‘comprehensive data on 
the availability of raw and secondary materials, including 
chemicals, across the economy to industry and the public 
sector, and by modelling scenarios around material 
availability’. The Office for National Statistics is leading the 
initial development of such a Datahub. As well as official 
statistics such as these, there is a large body of evidence 
contained in academic work which is currently difficult to 
access. Efforts towards Open Science practices ins fields 
such as Industrial Ecology are starting to improve the 
discoverability and reusability of this knowledge.
Better information will also be needed within and across 
supply chains, but there are challenges that will have 
to be overcome before this can be achieved. The first 
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is information gathering: it is still not normal practice 
by suppliers to gather information on all facets of their 
manufacturing process. Secondly, for business to share 
collected data with rest of the chain rather than storing in 
silos. Current corporate practices mean information is often 
not shared even with different groups within the same 
organisation let alone with “outsiders”. In the information 
age, industry has remained closed to information out-
flow. This may be attributed to good reasons, but the 
achievement of absolute zero requires, possibly above all 
else, the will to cooperate. The final challenge is analysis 
of the data and making sense of it. Gathering, storing, 
processing and presenting data is an energy intensive and 
expensive task, therefore currently most organisations do 
not have the appetite to undertake this without proven 
returns.
Digital tools can potentially help to enable this position. A 
universal and global approach to IP law and the tracking 
of information using technologies such as blockchain 
can greatly increase the confidence of organisations into 
opening their doors and sharing more of their information. 
By doing so it is possible to dramatic reduce resource 
duplication whilst enhancing visibility of resource usage. 
This could allow businesses to make long-term strategical 
decisions that lead to higher profitability whilst reducing 
energy usage and CO2 production.
Key Message: Good information is critical to transitions in individual behaviour, business operations 
and in supporting government action, but there are challenges to overcome in collecting and 
communicating the required information effectively to support decisions and influence behaviour.
Why aren’t all plans for zero emissions the same?
Several reports have presented scenarios for how we could achieve net-zero emissions in 2050, such as the Centre for 
Alternative Technology’s “Zero Carbon Britain” report. Unlike the need to reduce absolute energy use described in this report, 
they find instead that “industrial energy use is expected to remain similar to current levels”. How is it possible to reach such a 
different conclusion on the same question?
It is easier to see the differences by looking at the different 
assumptions made about the energy system. The figure on the 
right shows the deployment rates implied by their scenario, 
together with some reference points to provide context. The Zero 
Carbon Britain report has much more optimistic assumptions 
about the deployment rates of renewable generation 
technologies, especially very early-stage technologies such as 
producing liquid fuels from biomass – which has not yet been 
proven at commercial scale – and wave & tidal generation. 
Assumed deployment rates for offshore wind are also high, 
requiring a doubling in the speed of installation envisaged in 
the Governments plans for support through the 2020s.
Figure 3.3: Rates of increase in “Zero Carbon Britain” 
Wave/tidal
Synethic Biofuels
Oshore wind
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
% of current total UK primary energy use to be added each year
Onshore wind
Solar PV
Expected government 
support for oshore wind 
through 2020’s (2GW/year)
One new Hinkley 
Point C every 
three years
(3.2 GW/year)
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4. Opportunity
Key Message: Absolute zero requires societal change. This will provide opportunities for growth in 
business, education and research, governance and industrial strategy. To achieve zero emissions we 
must only pursue the right opportunities and restrain activities which are no longer compatible with 
a zero emission society.
4.1 Opportunities in business:  
This report has revealed an overwhelming wealth of 
innovation potential for businesses – but not in the area 
that dominates current discussion about mitigating 
climate change. Carbon Capture and Storage or Utilisation 
and “the Hydrogen economy” are important development 
opportunities and may be significant beyond 2050, 
but won’t play any significant part in national or global 
emissions reductions by 2050, because implementation 
at meaningful scale will take too long. Instead, taking 
the target of Absolute Zero seriously requires a massive 
expansion of wind and solar power generation, along 
with the infrastructure required to install, manage and 
deliver this power and the fertile supply chains of material 
extraction, production, construction and manufacturing.
The key innovation opportunities revealed in this report 
are not about how we generate energy, but how we use 
it. Meeting the target of Absolute Zero requires adapting 
to using around 60% of the energy we consume today, 
which without innovation will require restraint. However, 
section 2 of the report has revealed a tremendous space 
for business innovation and growth in expanding the 
benefit we receive from energy use. For the past century, 
our economy has grown based on an assumption of 
virtually unlimited energy supply without consequences. 
Unsurprisingly, this has led to extremely inefficient use 
– for example with cars weighing around 12 times more 
than the people within them. The more rapidly the UK 
commits to delivering its legally binding target, the 
greater the benefit it will extract from business innovation 
opportunities. Without question, some incumbent 
businesses such as the fossil fuel industries, will decline 
and inevitably they currently spend the most money on 
lobbying the government to claim that they are part of the 
solution. This is unlikely.
Instead, future UK growth depends on exploiting the 
opportunities created by the restraint of Absolute Zero. 
For example:
• All current aviation activity will be phased out within 
30 years, which creates an extraordinary opportunity 
for other forms of international communication (for 
example using the technologies of today’s gaming 
industry to transform today’s backwards-looking 
video-conferencing), for the travel and leisure 
industry to expand more localised vacations and for 
developments in non-emitting mid-range transport 
such as electric trains and buses
• The markets for electric cars, electric heating at all 
scales and temperatures, electric motors at all scales, 
building retrofit and thermal control are certain to 
grow at rates far ahead of the recent past. Electric 
cars comprise a small fraction of new sales today, but 
under current regulation will, by 2040, have captured 
100% of the market. Given the total energy supply 
constraint of Absolute Zero, the clear evidence of 
figure 2.6 is that the total market will either contract 
or shift rapidly towards smaller vehicles – this is a 
fertile and under-populated space.
• Cement and blast furnace steel production will be 
illegal within 30 years, yet our demand for construction 
and manufacturing will continue. To meet this 
demand our supply of bulk materials must transform 
and there is high-volume innovation potential for 
non-emitting cement substitutes, for technologies to 
support high-quality steel recycling, and in the open 
space of “material efficiency”: using half the material 
per product and keeping the products in use for twice 
as long.
Beyond the 2050 target of Absolute Zero, technologies 
that exist at early development stages today may expand 
into valuable business streams. These include:
• Carbon Capture and Storage or Utilisation applied to 
fossil fuel power stations, steel or cement production.
• The “hydrogen economy” once there is spare capacity 
in the supply of non-emitting electricity
• Other forms of electrical transport, including shipping 
and aviation
The 100% target of the Climate Change Act creates an 
extraordinary opportunity for UK business to develop the 
goods and services that will be the basis of a future global 
economy. However, the biggest commercial opportunities 
are not breakthrough but incremental developments from 
today’s technologies.
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4.2 Opportunities in welfare and 
education
Today’s secondary school entrants will be 43 in 2050. At 
that age, they will be in leadership positions, so the obvious 
question is what skills they should be developing now and 
in their subsequent higher-education years to underpin 
their decision-making abilities in a very different future 
world? The legacy of education is surely to know that it is 
the quality of the questions which one is able to ask which 
will lead to success. Asking the right questions is a sign 
of deep education, while answering these questions is an 
altogether easier proposition even if research is needed. 
How do we move from answering questions as the 
staple of education to asking questions as the hallmark 
of a necessary education for future uncertainty? Climate 
change provides us with exactly this opportunity. Some of 
the current syllabi in secondary schools will be irrelevant in 
future, and there will be new skills that school children will 
require. The same is true in universities, both in teaching 
and in research, where a clear distinction must be made 
between mitigation actions that can be deployed today 
through chosen restraint and innovations that might ease 
the challenge of restraint in future. The former implies hard 
decision-making, while the latter implies real opportunity. 
Starting with the difficult decisions, an educational 
setting should provide a timeline for actions to be taken 
by humanity in order to ensure that we hit our carbon-
reduction targets by 2050. Plans cannot merely relate to 
actions. They must also relate to the timings of such actions, 
as any Gantt Chart does. By working backwards from 2050, 
and sequentially working out the order and timing in 
which key mitigation actions need to be taken, a roadmap 
for the necessary restraint can be established. Across the 
secondary school system, this roadmap is essential in 
eliciting the questions which will inevitably come from 
the school children. This will enable an exploration of real 
change in the mind sets of those who will need to embrace 
change more than ever before later in their lives. Huge 
questions will emerge, such as: will internal-combustion 
engines disappear, will aeroplanes disappear, will meat-
and-dairy agriculture disappear and will we need to stop 
building things? By empowering school children to realise 
that asking the huge questions is appropriate, we will 
enable change to be embraced through education. The 
timing of the change should lead to questions of transition 
towards electrification, or the trade-offs between energy 
and labour in delivering services across a whole range of 
economic activities, for instance. What are the implications 
for consumption or ownership in a changing society, and 
how can we ensure that material use down to the finest 
granularity is all encapsulated in circularity?
Across the education system, we should be seizing the 
opportunity for the next generation to grow up with 
‘best practice’: from the food available in schools, the way 
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children get to school, to the way school buildings are 
used. All schools could immediately switch to providing 
meat-free meals – reducing emissions and promoting 
healthy eating. Existing efforts to change travel habits 
aimed at avoiding local air pollution around school gates 
can be extended to support parents and children in low-
carbon travel to school wherever possible. Many schools 
already feel the need to keep heating temperatures low in 
an effort to make severely constrained budgets balance, 
which is a side-effect that could be standardised across the 
system to help establish the normality of lower-energy, 
lower-temperature heating setpoints.
Looking beyond the need for this kind of restraint in the 
short term, there are enormous opportunities in education 
which we could be embracing now to ensure that when 
the painful period of mitigation nears an end, we have an 
educated population ready to take advantage of the zero-
carbon era. We do not have the luxury of time to wait for 
graduates to emerge who know something about future 
possibilities. We need to exploit the creativity, intelligence 
and ideas of our students before they have graduated. But 
what are the innovations which we should be teaching? 
We are still researching them, and research takes time. 
A potential solution to this unwanted time dependency is 
Vertically Integrated Projects (VIP), a concept developed 
by Georgia Tech, and which is now also operating 
successfully at the University of Strathclyde in the UK. 
In essence, undergraduate students across all years of 
study are involved in major inter-disciplinary research 
projects, each of which is aimed at a long-term complex 
research question. Strathclyde ensures that the 17 UN 
Sustainable Development Goals are central to their 
VIPs. In this way, undergraduate students not only learn 
key skills for the future, but they are indeed themselves 
creating knowledge for all simultaneously. It is the 
combination of empowerment, inter-disciplinarity, huge 
research questions, confidence and space to explore 
without fear of failure which brings this concept alive. In 
an era of extraordinary change and equally extraordinary 
opportunity, it feels right and proper that the most fertile 
brains are exploited and enriched in such a manner.
There are questions which the era of restraint begs 
concerning research and its funding in universities 
and companies. Is it right, for instance, to be funding 
research using public funds which includes technology-
developments which we know are not aligned with the 
17 UNSDGs? Examples might include trying to squeeze 
out efficiency gains in 20th century technologies or 
researching products which rely on scarce materials. 
Bold decisions are needed by schools, universities and 
funding bodies if we are to galvanise education and 
action towards rapid mitigation, followed by innovative 
opportunity. Across the span of education and research, 
areas of importance highlighted by this report include:
• Technologies and their constraints in efficient use of 
electric motors and electric heating
• The trade-offs between energy and labour in 
delivering services across the range of all economic 
activities
• Understanding of welfare dependent on self-
actualisation rather than consumption or ownership
• Maximising the value of secondary materials and the 
realities of reduce/re-use/recycling/ “circularity” etc.
• Renewable generation and the system of its efficient 
use.
The opportunity in education spans from preparing for the 
restraint required to achieve Absolute Zero to preparing 
for the longer-term transformation of prosperity beyond 
2050. What could a world look like without cement, internal 
combustion engines or aeroplanes? We need to educate 
students for this new reality, and embrace the opportunity, 
rather than the threat, which this reality offers.
Changing Building Design Practices through Education in the 1970’s
In the 1970’s, British Steel saw an opportunity to expand their market for structural steel sections, by 
persuading UK clients and the construction supply chain to switch from concrete framed buildings (which 
remain more common in many European countries even today) to steel framed buildings, like the one 
illustrated on page 35. Instead of seeking Government support to subsidise or legislate to support this 
change, they instead developed high quality teaching material and supported the development of new 
courses in all major civil engineering degree courses about design with steel. As a result, the next generation 
of graduate civil engineers entering the profession were equipped to use more steel, and expected it to be 
more normal practice.
This suggests an opportunity to develop teaching material that reconfigures society to adopt new 
approaches to thriving in a zero carbon economy, by changing the way we live and work.
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4.3 Opportunities in governance
The Olympic Games is one of the biggest government 
projects which has been delivered on time and to budget. 
It was a great success and a source of national pride. There 
are parallels between hosting the 2012 Olympic Games 
and delivering Absolute Zero. Both commitments were 
made on a world stage where failure to deliver would 
result in national embarrassment; both projects require 
collaboration of multiple government departments, 
industry and the general public; and both require delivery 
processes and structures to be built from scratch. We 
managed to overcome these challenges for the Olympics, 
but delivering Absolute Zero has additional challenges. 
To achieve our emissions goal we have to sustain 
momentum over a longer timespan than for the Olympics. 
We also have to consider life beyond 2050, what is the 
legacy of the net-zero emissions project? The Olympic 
legacy has been criticised for under delivering, so we must 
do better this time to ensure society can thrive in a zero 
emissions world beyond 2050. When we hosted the 2012 
Olympics we could draw on the experiences of historical 
Olympic Games to inform decisions being made, but no 
country has met a zero-emissions target before, there is 
no precedent for us to follow. Finally the 2012 Olympic 
developments generated growth in the delivery of new 
and improved infrastructure and services. Meeting the 
net-zero emission targets will generate growth in some 
industries, but will also require the decline of others, this is 
likely to be met with resistance as those who benefit from 
the status quo resist change. 
The London Olympics highlighted the following key 
lessons that could be transferred to emissions targets:
• Form a responsible body in government
• Limit innovation to knowledge gaps to reduce risk
• Maintain a unified cross party vision
• Have a protected and realistic budget
• Invest in programme management & delivery with 
discipline on time and scope change 
• Empower people, with the right skills and track record 
to deliver against clear responsibilities
• Ensure accountability, with scrutiny and assurance 
given when risk is identified. 
This section attempts to explore the first three of these 
lessons, the most relevant to Absolute Zero commitment. 
Responsible body in government:
For the 2012 Olympics an executive non-departmental 
public body (NDPB) called the Olympic Delivery Authority 
(ODA) was established to deliver the infrastructure and 
venues required for the Olympics. In parallel the London 
Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic 
Games (LOCOG) was established as a private company 
limited by guarantee to fund and stage the Games. The 
government set up the Government Olympic Executive 
(GOE) within the Department for Culture, Media & Sport. 
The GOE was responsible for other elements of the games, 
such as transport and security, as well as overseeing the 
ODA and LOCOG. Although the governance structures 
were considered to be complex, it has been reported that 
they allowed quick decision making and ensured people 
remained engaged throughout the delivery process. Figure 
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4.1 gives an example of how this structure could be applied 
to delivering Absolute Zero. The proposed Government 
Absolute Zero Executive would be even more critical since 
it would be required to coordinate multiple industries and 
organisations, rather than just two delivery bodies as was 
the case in the 2012 Olympics. The governance structure 
proposed in figure 4.1 would enable fast decision making 
and accountability to meeting interim goals, which is 
essential if we are going to meet the 2050 zero emission 
targets. 
Limit innovation:
The Government Olympic Executive deliberately 
limited innovation to fill knowledge gaps. This move 
was considered to be counter-intuitive, but successful. 
Relying only on proven technologies reduced the risk of 
failure and avoided the temptation to use the Games to 
showcase risky innovation. Although the Olympics did not 
innovate new ways of doing things, it did require existing 
activities to be scaled up to meet unprecedented demand. 
As Jeremy Beeton, Director General of the Government 
Olympic Executive explains “It was a whole new business 
model for London.” This scaling up of proven technologies 
and systems was seen as a risk in itself. This lesson should 
be transferred to the task of meeting the 2050 zero-
emission targets. We have identified in this report ‘bright 
spots’ where best practice exists and could be scaled up, 
if we apply the Olympic approach, this is enough of a risk, 
and further innovation should be limited. That said, we 
don’t currently have all the answers to transition to a net-
zero society and some innovation will be necessary, but 
approached with caution. 
Cross party vision:
The delivery of the 2012 Olympic Games was supported by 
a unified cross party vision which was maintained through 
regular progress reports. This enabled stability throughout 
government changes which allowed the project to 
maintain momentum. The UK’s approach to climate 
change does not currently have a unified cross party 
vision. For example the Labour party proposes moving 
the zero-emissions targets to 2030. Whilst parties argue 
over goals and targets, actions are not being taken and we 
fall further behind on the journey to zero-emissions. It is 
essential that government generate a unified cross party 
vision to emulate the success of the 2012 Olympics which 
was able to create clear roles and responsibilities which 
fostered collaborative problem solving, not blame shifting. 
If we are to learn from our previous successes, the 
net-zero target is more likely to be achieved through 
the establishment of the Government Absolute Zero 
Executive and the associated Delivery Authority with 
cross party support. The Executive should set a strategy 
which is realistic and risk averse, without over-reliance of 
innovation. 
Figure 4.1: Olympic-style governance structure for UK Climate Emergency Response:
Absolute Zero
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Executive NDPB responsible for 
delivering infrastructure projects
Climate Change 
Committee
Independent government
advisory body
Government Absolute
 Zero Executive:
Unit within BEIS and lead government entity co-ordinating the 
Absolute Zero response
Local Government
Authority:
Responsible for delivering 
regional transformation projects
Government
Departments:
including DfT, BEIS, DEFRA, CLG,
Home Oce & HM Treasury
Industry:
Private companies responsible
for running zero carbon 
businesses
Senior Responsible Owners Group
Includes SROs from each work-
stream & delivery body 
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4.4 Opportunities for Industrial 
Strategy in the UK
With a legal target, now set by the UK government, to 
achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, UK business are 
developing organisational strategies to ensure they will 
prosper in a zero emissions business landscape. This report 
has shown how placing resource efficiency at the heart 
of industrial strategy can enable businesses to prosper, 
but this requires significant changes in the products, 
production processes and supply chain systems which 
currently make up the industrial sector. 
The UK government has invested £5m in the UK FIRES 
research programme, bringing together the academics 
from six universities who have written this report with 
businesses across the supply-chain in a ‘Living Lab’. The 
subscribing industrial partners pose strategic challenges 
to the academic research team and test emerging solutions 
in practice. 
UK FIRES research will support businesses in developing 
industrial strategies to achieve zero emissions in key four 
areas illustrated in fig. 4.2:.  
1. Opportunity mapping will identify new methods of 
design and manufacture which improve on existing 
best practices. Software tools to enumerate all 
options for design and delivery of resource intensive 
goods with today’s technologies will be developed 
and commercialised.
2. The tools of recent advances in data science will be 
applied in a new Resource Observatory, to provide 
the highest-resolution insights into the UK’s use of 
resources, with new metrics, scenarios and search 
tools used to identify opportunities for valuable 
innovation and efficiency gains.  These tools will 
give UK FIRES industry partners foresight in decision 
making. 
3. Through specific case studies of process, product 
and service innovation, the UK FIRES consortium will 
seek to define the innovation pathways by which 
the new practices of resource efficiency can be 
the basis of thriving UK businesses. The Living Lab 
industrial partners will be supported to exploit these 
opportunities in practice. 
4. To support holistic industrial strategies and supply 
chains UK FIRES researchers will create responsive 
strategic analysis tools. Living Lab industrial partners 
can then apply these findings through the generation 
of new business models in collaboration with the UK 
FIRES Policy Champion.
The output of the UK FIRES Living Lab collaboration will 
be published in quarterly reports, made available for 
government and industry, to provide reliable information 
to inform the development of their net zero industrial 
strategies.   Focus themes for future Living Lab reports are 
now outlined.  
UK FIRES connections
UK FIRES aims to provide data, tools, experience and 
analysis to support its partner companies in specifying 
new business models, diffusing innovation, giving holistic 
foresight to new opportunities and improving best 
practice as they pursue Resource Efficiency for a net-zero 
industrial strategy. 
UK FIRES members can access the resources of the £5m 
programme through: 
• Quarterly meetings of the Living Lab, in which 
members across the bulk materials supply chains 
specify target challenges for future work, support 
current activity and provide feedback on the 
application of programme insights in practice. 
• Early access to emerging analysis of strategic 
opportunities 
• Shared or dedicated PhD students applying the 
collective insights of the UK FIRES team to specific 
commercial contexts 
• Pilot testing of new tools developed in the research 
programme 
• Shaping the agenda and participating in the Annual 
UK FIRES Resource Efficiency Forum.
For more information contact info@ukfires.org.uk
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Figure 4.2: UK FIRES programme structure
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Notes to the figures
Figure 1.1: Assuming an additional 400 TWh/year is needed 
by 2050, to be supplied by offshore wind, we need to 
have 115 GW of offshore wind capacity operational by 
2050 (assuming an approximate capacity factor of 40% 
for offshore wind). The Crown Estate estimates that 
projects with seabed rights being awarded in 2021 would 
become operational by 2030, so all projects needed 
for 2050 would need to be started by 2040. Although 
current capacity is 9 GW, there is an additional 25 GW 
already in the pipeline. Therefore new projects need to 
be established and built at a rate of 4.5 GW/year for the 
next two decades.
Figure 1.3: Data from the International Energy Agency 
(IEA, 2018) with data on CCS installations at power-
stations from the Oil and Gas funded pro-CCS lobby, 
Global CCS Institute. 
Figure 1.4: This analysis by Vaclav Smil (2014) looks at 
global deployments of the three major fossil fuels, 
relative to total world energy demand at the time. Some 
faster transitions have occurred in individual countries, 
as shown in the box story on page 3.
Figure 1.5: The data in this figure come from a survey 
of academic reports by Gross et al. (2018) on the 
introductions of a range of new technologies - which 
generally showed that energy technology changes are 
among the slowest to reach full deployment. 
Figure 1.6: Sectoral breakdown of UK energy demand from 
DUKES (2019); UK domestic internal temperature history 
from Official Statistics (2014); European car weight (and 
similar trends for all other regions) from the Global Fuel 
Economy Initiative a partnership with the International 
Energy Agency and others. 
Figures 1.7–1.8: All constructed using data from DUKES 
(2019). n.b. there are many ways of calculating the 
equivalence of fuels - typically, the units of “Mega-tonnes 
of oil equivalent” are used, but this is not obvious when 
comparing primary electricity (nuclear or renewably 
powered electricity) which is not the result of conversion 
in a power station. We have attempted to be consistent 
in reporting the Mtoe equivalence of total UK energy 
demand.
Figure 1.9: Constructed with yearly data on electricity 
supplied in the UK from DUKES (2019). Electricity 
generated via non-emitting sources is shown as stacked 
lines whereas electricity generated from coal, gas and oil 
is plotted in a separate line.
Figure 1.10:  The cost figures represent the weighted 
average of the levelized cost of electricity of 
commissioned solar and onshore wind projects in the 
United Kingdom and were obtained from IRENA (2018). 
For solar photovoltaic generation only cost figures after 
2010 were reported. The figures were converted from US 
dollars to Pound sterling using yearly average exchange 
rates. The power density points for onshore wind were 
obtained using the power density of 61 wind farms 
commissioned between 1992 and 2007 compiled by 
Mackay (2009). These data-points were averaged by year 
of commissioning using installed capacity as averaging 
weight. The installed capacity and commissioning dates 
were obtained from Department for Business, Energy & 
Industrial Strategy (2019). The power density points for 
solar photovoltaic were estimated using best available 
cell efficiency data provided by National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory (2019) for multi-crystalline Si Cells in 
conjunction with the UK’s annual insolation data from 
Photovoltaic Geographical Information System (2017) 
and a performance ratio of 84 % obtained from National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory (2013).
Figure 1.11: This chart was constructed using 2005 global 
energy data supplied by the International Energy Agency, 
and multiple sources to estimate the allocation of energy 
to devices and “passive systems” - the equipment (such as 
a car or house) in which  the final form of energy (typically 
mechanical work or heat) is exchanged for a service. The 
chart is from Cullen et al. (2010), which has a lengthy 
Supplementary Information file giving every detail of 
the estimations. It is currently arduous to update this 
form of analysis - and a target of the UK FIRES research 
programme is to use the emerging techniques of Data 
Science to make this easier - but we assume that the 
proportions of energy use have remained approximately 
similar from 2005 to today.
Figure 1.12: Data taken from Haberl et al. (2007), subject 
to uncertainty due to definitions and the need for 
estimation of un-measurable data.
Figure 1.13: all the values represent “real world” efficiencies 
of conversion devices. The efficiency of electric heater, 
light and electronic devices was obtained by Cullen and 
Allwood (2010). The efficiency of electric battery charging 
applies to charging road vehicles and was obtained from 
Apostolaki-Iosifidou et al. (2017). The efficiency of heat 
pumps is the average of all the values reported by Shapiro 
and Puttagunta (2016) who quantified the coefficient of 
performance of these devices during use in residential 
buildings. The remaining values were obtained by Paoli 
and Cullen (2019).  
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Figure 1.14: Figure 1.14: This Sankey diagram was obtained 
using UK energy consumption data for 2018 from National 
Statistics (2018) and the conversion factors of figure 1.13. 
The data is disaggregated by energy type and sector. 
The total electricity demand was scaled to account for 
population growth using the predictions from National 
Statistics (2019) and the distribution losses from OECD/
IEA (2018). In addition to the efficiencies of figure 1.13, 
the efficiency of charging electric car batteries was taken 
from Apostolaki-Iosifidou et al. (2017).
Figure 1.15: This analysis, building on the energy diagram 
of fig. 1.11 was developed in order to provide clarity for 
the IPCC’s 5th Assessment Report, and based on global 
emissions data for 2010 taken from the EU’s EDGAR 
database of global emissions. The original analysis was 
published as Bajzelj et al (2013) but has been modified 
here to clarify the difference between emissions that 
occur as equipment (cars, boilers, lights) are used, and 
those that occur in industry when making equipment that 
lasts for more than one year.  The UK FIRES programme 
is largely concerned with these industrial emissions, so 
clarifying the way that stock of goods in service (and 
therefore their requirements for energy inputs) evolve 
over time, is of critical importance to understanding 
how to develop an Industrial Strategy compatible with 
Absolute Zero. 
Figure 2.1: This figure is a summary of the analysis leading 
to figs. 2.2, 2.4, 2.11 and 2.19.
Figure 2.2: Today’s values on energy use in buildings were 
obtained from UK energy statistics (HM Government, 
2019). The values in the second column were calculated 
using the method described in the notes for Figure 
1.13 and the efficiency values estimated by Cullen et al. 
(2010). The values in the third column were calculated 
considering the efficiency improvements of better 
insulation of roofs and attics, and the installation of 
double-glazed windows estimated by the IEA (2013), 
considering the number of surviving buildings in 2050 
estimated by Cabrera Serrenho et al. (2019).
Figure 2.3: Impact of new buildings and retrofit from 
Cabrera Serrenho et al. (2019) and IEA (2013), use of 
heat pumps for space heating (MacKay, 2008), Appliance 
efficiency improvements (ECUK, 2019, table A1).
Fig 2.4: Today’s values on energy use in transport were 
obtained from UK energy statistics (HM Government, 
2019) and IEA energy balances (IEA, 2019). The values 
in the second column were calculated using the 
method described in the notes for Figure 1.13 and the 
efficiency values estimated by Cullen et al. (2010). The 
values in the third column were calculated considering 
no international aviation, the substitution of domestic 
shipping and aviation by rail, a reduction of energy use 
in passenger road transport to 60% of current levels (as 
demonstrated in Figure 2.6) and a reduction of 30% in 
road freight energy demand (Dadhich et al., 2014).
Figure 2.5: Emissions factors from the BEIS Greenhouse 
gas reporting conversion factors 2019. Equivalent energy 
intensities calculated using the BEIS values for fuel CO2e 
intensities, apart from rail which was calculated using 
the CO2e intensity factor for electric traction. Radiative 
forcing corrections are included in the emissions 
intensities for flying. Data for cars are for the current 
average fleet of petrol cars.
Figure 2.6: Developed assuming a linear correlation 
between vehicle weight and fuel consumption (there is 
reasonable empirical support for this) and with current 
vehicle weight taken from fig. 1.6.
Figure 2.7: Effect of vehicle weight reduction (Cullen et 
al., 2011), logistical improvements (Dadhich et al, 2014), 
regenerative braking (Gonzalez-Gil et al, 2014), drag and 
rolling resistance (Cullen et al, 2011).
Figure 2.8: developed considering the number of cars 
purchased and discarded in the UK estimated by 
Serrenho et al. (2017), with full adoption of electric cars 
in new sales from 2025.
Figure 2.9: This is constructed from emissions intensities 
reported by Scarborough et al. (2014) combined with data 
on portion sizes and calories per portion from the UK’s 
National Health Service (www.nhs.uk/live-well/healthy-
weight/calorie-checker/). There is significant uncertainty 
behind the numbers in this figure - due to the difficulty 
of defining the boundaries of analysis for the emissions 
calculation, and the arbitrary size of portions - but the 
scale of difference between the two foods is significant.
Figure 2.10: Is taken from Bajzelj et al. (2014) as used for 
fig. 1.15
Figure 2.11: Current energy consumption data from ECUK: 
End uses data tables, 2018, split by 2 digit SIC. Where 
further disaggregation was needed e.g. chemicals sector, 
consumption was split by the according proportions in 
2007, where data is provided at 4 digit SIC level. Energy 
embodied in net imports for steel, cement, plastics 
and textiles by multiplying the energy intensity of UK 
production by the net imports of each material; tonnage 
data from Allwood et al. (2019), Shanks et al. (2019), ImpEE 
project and Allwood et al. (2006) respectively. Energy 
loss in electricity production is from DUKES aggregate 
energy balances, 2018. Energy for direct fuel combustion 
was converted to electricity using the relevant efficiency 
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values provided in Figure 1.11. Demand reduction 
interventions: 1) reduce scrap in metal processing to 
half of the current level, i.e. half of the savings identified 
in Milford et al. (2011); 2) reduce metal consumption 
by 20% by avoiding over-design of metal products, 
consistent with Section 2.3, Section 2.1 and Allwood and 
Cullen (2012); 3) A 75% cut in cement output based as 
described in Section 2.2; 4) Life extension of cars, clothes 
and industrial goods, reducing output of these products 
by 40%, 45% and 40% respectively. Proportions of steel 
and aluminium usage as per the global data provided 
in Allwood and Cullen (2012). 5) Reduction in plastic 
packaging by 25%; in the UK plastics packaging is 2.2Mt 
out of 6.3Mt total consumption estimated from the 
ProdCom database; 6) A 25% cut in fertiliser use, half of 
the reduction identified for Netherlands in Section 2.2; 7) 
Reduction of food waste leading to a 3% cut in output in 
the food processing industry as per the WRAP Courthald 
Commitment; 8) More efficient use of electricity in 
industry by improving efficiency of motors, heat pumps 
for space heating, process heating and lighting from 
60% to 80%, 104% to 400%, 80% to 90% and 13% to 15% 
respectively, consistent with Cullen and Allwood (2010). 
Figure 2.12: Original analysis for this report developed by 
C.F.Dunant
Figure 2.13: Developed from Cooper et al. (2014).
Figure 2.14: Original version of this figure published in 
Allwood et al. (2012) modified here to show primary 
production from blast furnaces declining to zero in-line 
with the zero emissions target.
Figure 2.15: Developed from Daehn et al. (2019)
Figure 2.16: The flows of plastics in the UK were estimated 
from the UK trade statistics (Eurostat, 2018), using a 
systematic allocation of trade product codes into the 
various stages of the supply chain, and by estimating the 
plastic content and application for each produce code.
Figure 2.17: Developed from Shanks et al. (2019
Figure 2.18: A survey of structural engineers, MEICON 
showed that, in general, structural engineers are 
prepared to over-design structures routinely in order 
to pre-empt any possible later changes to the brief, to 
deal with design risk and to cover for the possibility of 
construction error.  Material efficient design, for example 
using fabric form-work, could allow substantial reduction 
in over-use without any increase in risk.
Figure 2.19: Current energy consumption data from ECUK: 
End uses data tables, 2018, split by 2 digit SIC, and where 
further disaggregation needed (e.g. separating primary 
and secondary wood processing) 2007 data at 4 digit SIC 
level. Energy loss in electricity production, conversion 
of direct fuel combustion to electricity and demand 
reduction interventions are all as described in Figure 
2.23.
Figure 2.20: Allocation of emissions from global materials 
production to the six key sectors based on material flow 
analysis of steel (Cullen  et al., 2012), cement (Shanks et 
al, 2019), Aluminium (Cullen and Allwood, 2013), plastic 
(Allwood et al, 2012), Paper (Counsell and Allwood, 2007), 
food (Bajzelj et al. 2014)
Figure 2.22: This data is made publicly available by the car 
industry. Horton and Allwood (2017) review the data, and 
explore several options by which this form of material 
inefficiency could be addressed.
Figure 2.23: Manufacturing energy efficiency 
imporvements (Paoli and Cullen, 2019), scrap metal 
reduction (Milford et al, 2011), reducing over-design and 
ilfe-extension (Allwood & Cullen, 2012), plastic packaging 
(Lavery et al, 2013), food waste (WRAP, 2018)
Figure 2.24: The proportions of losses here are indicative 
and based on data in Li et al (2016). The actually losses 
vary according to the way the hydrogen is stored and 
the precise pattern of demand by which electricity is 
extracted from the fuel cell.
Figure 3.3: The Zero Carbon Britain (Allen et al, 2013) 
report sets out a scenario for energy supply in 2050. 
We have calculated the amount that energy generation 
from each source would have to increase in every year 
from now to 2050 to achieve the target. Increases are 
presented as a percentage of current UK primary energy 
demand of about 2200 TWh (BEIS, 2019). Expectations for 
Government support for offshore wind in the 2020s are 
from the Crown Estate (2019), converted into generation 
values with a representative capacity factor for offshore 
wind of 40%. A review of Biomass to Liquid systems for 
transport fuel production reports that no commercial 
scale plants are yet operating (Dimitriou, 2018).
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Absolute Zero: some short-term restraint in our use of energy, but no restraint whatsoever in what we most enjoy...
